Absconding and Other Supervision Violations: A Study of Probationers, Parolees, and Dual Supervision in New Mexico

Authored by:

Kristine Denman, M.A.

Dale Willits, Ph.D.

Jenna Dole, B.A.

Research assistance:

Veronica Carrion

Maribel Jáuregui

Connor Magnuson

Sarah Spain

New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center

Kristine Denman, Director

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Report highlights

This study examined violations of supervision among a cohort of individuals under state supervision in New Mexico. We included probationers, who comprise the vast majority of those under state supervision, parolees, and those supervised under dual supervision (both probation and parole). We focused on several key questions, intended to improve our understanding of violations of supervision and revocations. Additionally, we built on our prior study of parole violations where we found that absconding was one of the most common violations of parole, and the most salient predictor of revocation. The key differences between the prior study and the current one are that we expanded the study population to include probationers, and added variables that may help to explain absconding behavior. Our overall objectives for this part of the study were to explore the risk and protective factors associated with absconding, and to understand whether these differed by supervision type. In the summary below, we list each of the key questions guiding the research and summarize the key findings.

What are the rates of violations overall, by type, and by type of community supervision?

64% of individuals in our sample had one or more technical violations.

Rates of violations varied by supervision type:

- 73% of those under dual supervision committed one or more technical violations, with an average of 2.21 violations per person
- 64% of probationers committed one or more technical violations, with an average of 1.95 violations per person
- 61% of parolees committed one or more technical violations, with an average of 1.25 violations per person
- Differences could be due, in part, to exposure time: the average number of days on supervision or until the study ended, whichever came first, was 753 days for dual supervision, whereas for probation it was 607 days and parole 616 days

The most common type of violation regardless of supervision type was for a drug offense. New offenses and absconding were the next most common offenses. However, parolees experience lower rates of each of these violations relative to probationers or those under dual status.

What is the average time to violation and how does this vary by community supervision type?

The average time to violation was 172 days, with a median of 101 days.

Time to first violation varied by supervision type:

- On average, parolees violated most quickly (161 days), followed by probationers (169 days), then those under dual supervision (218 days)

- However, median times suggest different results:
    - Half of the probationers violated supervision within 95.5 days
    - Half of the parolees violated supervision within 109 days
    - Half of those under dual supervision violated supervision within 150 days

What are the rates of return to prison by supervision level and types of violations?

30% of the sample was revoked to prison for some time. This varied greatly by supervision type:

- 18% of probationers were revoked to prison
- 76% of parolees were revoked to prison
- 72% of those serving dual supervision were revoked to prison

Regardless of supervision type, revocations most often occurred when someone absconded or committed a new offense. However, rates of revocation varied by supervision type, with parolees and those serving a dual term of supervision most often revoked.

Individuals who were revoked to prison who only had a history of technical violations had a greater average number of violations (2.25) than those who had a history of absconding (1.67) or new offenses (1.38). Regardless of violation type, parolees accrued a smaller number of violations before revocation relative to either probationers or those serving a dual term.

What individual, supervision, and community characteristics are associated with time to absconding? How do these vary by supervision type?

We addressed these questions with descriptive statistics. Bivariate analyses revealed that time to absconding was significantly shorter for individuals with the following characteristics:

- Younger individuals
- Native Americans and African Americans
- Those underemployed or unemployed
- Those with a history of drug problems
- Those with a history of absconding
- Those with a more extensive criminal history
- Those with a prior criminal history involving property offenses or drugs
- Those whose most serious current offense involved drugs or DWI
- Those with fewer special conditions of supervision
- Parolees

We also found that shorter time to absconding was associated with community characteristics, such as:

- Racial heterogeneity
- Female-headed households
- Public assistance

- Renter-occupied housing
- Population density

We discovered that the results differed somewhat by supervision type. Some of these factors were no longer statistically significant when we disaggregated the data by supervision type. One notable finding was that under- or unemployed parolees took longer to abscond than employed parolees. The same was true for those under dual status, though the results were not statistically significant.

Time to absconding varied by supervision type:

- Parolees tend to abscond sooner in their supervision, after which absconding tends to taper off
- Probationers and those under dual status abscond at about the same rate throughout supervision

What individual, supervision, and community characteristics are associated with absconding? How do these vary by supervision type?

In order to address these questions, we explored the bivariate relationship between each control and independent variable with absconding, and then considered all of these variables together in a series of multivariate models. We estimated models with all cases, and then disaggregated the data and computed the same models by supervision type. This allowed us to compare whether the same variables were associated with absconding for each supervision type.

While bivariate analyses indicated that nearly all of the control and independent variables included in our study were related to absconding, some of these relationships did not hold in multivariate analyses. Additionally, not all of the variables associated with absconding held once we disaggregated the data by supervision type.

The graphic below illustrates the findings of the multivariate analyses. The circles list the variables that were significant predictors of absconding. The darkest circles are those that were significantly associated with absconding, regardless of supervision type (also denoted with the superscripts after the variable name). The next shade of blue indicates variables that were significant for at least two supervision types. The circles with the lightest shade of blue are those that were significant for only one supervision type. These variables were also statistically significant predictors of absconding in the overall model (when we did not disaggregate by supervision type), except a history of prior absconding and history of likely mental health problems.



The results indicate that:

- Age, race/ethnicity, prior arrests, and property offending are all significantly related to absconding regardless of supervision type.
    - The likelihood of absconding increases as offender age decreases and as prior arrests increase
    - In the full model and the probation only model, individuals identified as Hispanic, Native American, or African American were significantly more at risk of absconding than whites
    - Native Americans were consistently at increased risk of absconding relative to whites, regardless of supervision type
    - Those with a current property offense had a greater likelihood of absconding than those charged with any other offense
- History of drug use, supervision level, and having to register as a sex offender were all significantly related to absconding for some individuals.
    - Probationers and those under dual supervision with a history of drug use had a greater likelihood of absconding than those without a history of drug use
    - Supervision level was significantly related to absconding for both probationers and parolees. Individuals on higher levels of supervision were more likely to abscond than those on lower levels
    - Being registered as a sex offender significantly decreases the likelihood of absconding for parolees and those under dual supervision

- Unemployment, prior absconding, likely mental health problems, number of special conditions, and percent unemployed were positively and significantly related to likelihood of absconding for those on probation only
- Gender and population density were only significant for parolees. Males had a greater likelihood of absconding, and parolees were more likely to abscond in areas with greater population density
- The variables that were significantly related to absconding can generally be considered risk or protective factors with the exception of race, which should be considered a correlate to absconding

We also estimated PWE survival models to account for varied exposure time and absconding to assess whether the relationships found in the multivariate analyses above held once time was considered. We found very similar results. These consistent results indicate greater evidence for particular risk or protective factors. However, we did find a few differences between the full sample multi-level logistic regression and the PWE survival models.

- Prior absconding was significant in the multi-level logistic regression model for probationers only (not the full model or those for parolees and dual supervision), but was not significant in any of the survival analysis models; thus, there is less evidence that prior absconding is a risk factor for absconding once time and other variables are taken into account.
- The community unemployment rate was significant in the multi-level logistic regression model, but it was not significant in the survival analyses.
- Population density positively and significantly predicted time until absconding for all supervision types in the survival analysis models, but it was only significant for parolees in the multi-level logistic regression model.

Section I: Introduction

States across the nation are responsible for supervising millions of probationers and parolees in the community each year. Generally, both probation and parole are intended to deter future offending and to rehabilitate offenders. Probation is intended to offer appropriate candidates an alternative to prison, while parole is meant to help individuals reintegrate into society. All probationers and parolees are subject to a variety of conditions they must adhere to in order to successfully complete their community supervision. Terms of supervision can be wide-ranging, but all require that individuals refrain from committing new offenses and, if actively monitored, report to their probation or parole officer (PPO). Other conditions typically include drug testing, reporting employment and/or residence changes, and participation in treatment as needed. Those who fail to follow those conditions are subject to punishment, ranging from a reprimand to revocation to prison. In this study, we examine supervision violations among those under community supervision in New Mexico, with a special emphasis on absconding.

Background

In Fiscal Year 2013, on average, the New Mexico Corrections Department's (NMCD) Probation and Parole Division (PPD) supervised over 16,000 individuals (NMCD Annual Report 2012-2013). Probationers comprise the largest proportion of the community supervision population. Most probationers have not served any time in prison for their convicted offense(s) though some released prisoners serve both a parole term and a term of probation, usually consecutively (referred to as "dual supervision"). The remainder of the state supervised population is comprised of parolees: offenders who are released from prison and serve some period of community supervision. In FY13, parolees comprised just 8% of the average community supervision population (ibid).

Like parolees, probationers who commit new crimes or violate the terms of their probation are subject to sanctions up to and including prison. Per policy, NMCD utilizes a tiered system of sanctions for technical violations and incentives for compliance. Policies are in place to avoid revocation and incarceration when possible and "to the extent that public safety allows" (CD-052800). Violations are categorized as either Class A (those that do not create a threat to self or others and do not constitute a new criminal offense) or Class B (those that constitute a criminal offense including pending charges and absconding).

In 2010, the New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center conducted a study (Denman, Broidy, Willits, Gonzales, Albright and Kleymann, 2010) examining parole violations and revocations among a cohort of parolees who began parole in 2005-2006 in New Mexico. We found that most parolees (67%) violated the conditions of their parole at least once; most violated more than once. Over half of those who violated did so within the first six months of their parole term, and just over half were fully or partially revoked to prison at least once during their parole term. Most of those revocations were for a technical violation rather than a new offense. The most common types of violations involved drugs, followed by failure to report/abscond. Patterns among probationers, though, may be different.

Absconding among probationers and parolees is taken very seriously by criminal justice agencies in New Mexico. The NMCD describes absconders as those whose "whereabouts are no longer known to the supervising Probation Parole Officer (PPO) after reasonable efforts have been made to locate them" (http://www.corrections.state.nm.us/ostm/ostm.html). In 2016, just under 10% of the supervised population were considered absconders on any given day.[1] Absconders are considered a threat to community safety; further, absconding behavior may suggest an unwillingness to rehabilitate, and criminal justice agencies may fear the political consequences if an absconder commits a new high-profile crime (Williams, McShane and Dolny, 2000).

The data bear out how seriously corrections officials consider absconding. Research consistently shows that individuals who have absconded are revoked from community supervision at greater rates than those who commit a technical offense (Belshaw, 2011; Cohen, 1995; Grattet et al., 2009), and they are generally treated as severe violators, second only to those who commit new crimes. Mirroring these findings, in New Mexico we found that 84% of those who absconded from parole were revoked, and that absconding was the most salient predictor of revocation (Denman et al., 2010).

In our prior report, we explored variables associated with both technical violations and with absconding. We found that these were often not the same, suggesting that at least in some aspects, absconders represent a unique group of offenders. Consistent with other literature (Grattet et al, 2009; Mayzer et al, 2004; Schwaner, 1997; Williams et al., 2000) we found *individual characteristics* (i.e., age and race), *weaker social ties* (i.e., employment status, marital status, gang affiliation*), supervision characteristics* (i.e., sex offender registrants), and *current offense* (i.e., property offenses) were significantly related to parole absconding. Criminal history, typically a predictor of recidivism, was not related to absconding. The literature suggests other factors that were not included in our prior study are likely related to absconding behavior. For example, *community characteristics* may play a role in absconding behavior. Some studies (Grattet et al., 2009; Kubrin and Stewart, 2006) have found that individuals who live in neighborhoods characterized by socioeconomic disadvantage were more likely to abscond.

While our prior study of parole violations and revocations is of use to a wide variety of stakeholders, there are some limitations. First, the original work included information on parole violators only. Very little is known about the violation patterns among New Mexico probationers, who comprise the greatest proportion of individuals supervised in the community.

Additionally, since completing the prior study (which tracked a 2005-2006 cohort), a number of changes have occurred within the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) that may impact violating behavior, including rates of violations. For example, in 2008, New Mexico increased the minimum term of community supervision for sex offenders from two years to five years, with a possible maximum of

[1] This is calculated from the reported number of absconders (pg. 3, http://cd.nm.gov/docs/2016_FAQS_NMCD_LEGISLATIVE_PACKET.pdf) relative to the number of individuals on supervision (pg. 1, ibid).

their natural life depending on the crime committed (N.M. Stat. § 31-21-10.1). The NMCD also created an Interstate Compact Office that operates under the PPD. Besides overseeing parolees who parole out of state, the office is responsible for issuing warrants for those who abscond (2011-2012 Strategic Plan; http://cd.nm.gov/ppd/ppd.html). In 2009, the NMCD expanded its absconder definitions and procedures to include those who walk away from residential treatment (CD-052802).

Other initiatives are aimed at improving outcomes through rehabilitative measures. For example, NMCD has been increasing expenditures and expanding community substance abuse treatment and housing (2012-2013 Annual Report). Additionally, NMCD implemented system-wide training in Motivational Interviewing (MI) targeting probation/parole staff, institutional programming staff, classification staff, and behavioral health bureau staff. In FY13, the NMCD reported that 0% of their staff was trained in MI; in FY14, their goal was to train 100% of their staff. MI is a method of prompting individuals to change their behavior; probation and parole offices may expect to see reduced serious violations and revocations as a result. Also in the last few years, NMCD changed where they supervise offenders, from office visits to field visits.

Finally, although we found that absconding was the strongest predictor of parole revocation, we did not study absconding in depth. Addressing absconding and reducing recidivism are priorities for the NMCD and the Governor's Office. A better understanding of absconding and those who abscond are important for informing policies and procedures designed to reduce the extent of the problem.

Current study

Although we know some about the characteristics of parole violators, violations, and revocations from our prior study, we do not know about probation violators. Thus, our first objective is to explore violations and returns to prison among probationers, parolees, and those under dual supervision. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions: *What are the rates of violations overall, by type, and by type of community supervision? What is the average time to violation and how does this vary by community supervision type? What are the rates of return to prison by supervision level and types of violations?*

We are especially interested in absconding. Thus, our second objective is to explore absconding more comprehensively. Specifically, we examine the following: *What individual, supervision and community characteristics are associated with absconding? How do these vary by supervision type? How are these variables related to time to absconding?*

Sample

The sample includes all individuals who began state community supervision between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2012. This cohort was chosen because it is subsequent to changes that have occurred statutorily and procedurally (e.g., increased length of sex offender supervision, expansion of definition of absconders), but prior to anticipated widespread changes (e.g., MI training) that, if fully and uniformly adopted, would likely impact the success of individuals under community supervision. Thus, this sample can serve as a baseline to measure change.

We followed the cohort for a period of 36 months. This time frame was chosen because the majority of parolees serve a sentence of one or two years and the average sentence length of probationers is around three years. In addition, we expect that most of those who fail on community supervision will do so within the first year. Thus, we anticipate this follow-up period would be sufficient to capture most violations and returns to prison.

Data sources

We relied on four sources of data for this study. First, we utilized data from NMCD's Corrections Management Information System (CMIS). The CMIS data is housed in a relational database organized as a series of tables. The NMSC regularly receives data from prison admissions and releases, Risk/Needs assessments, and, more recently, probation and parole violations; these data were all used for this study. In addition, the NMCD provided additional data needed for this project. Specifically, they compiled the terms of supervision for each person in our sample, which includes dates, locations, and initial conditions of supervision for everyone in our sample. In addition, they created a dataset with all of the recorded addresses for each person in the sample; from that, they identified the likely "best" address for each individual. Generally, the "best" address was the one that was closest to the supervision period of interest; in some cases, we chose an alternate address if the identified address was incomplete or otherwise problematic. The NMCD provided these data in Excel, which we converted to SPSS. The CMIS data include a unique offender number which was used to join each of the CMIS datasets together.

The second source of data was the state's criminal history data maintained by the New Mexico Department of Public Safety (DPS). The NMSAC and NMSC receive individual level statewide arrest data on a quarterly basis; these are the same data used to populate an individual's state criminal history record. Participating agencies submit hardcopy fingerprint cards or electronic impressions that include personal identifiers and information about the arrest. Each entry represents a custody change: arrest or incarceration, with one line of data for each offense type associated with a given arrest or incarceration.

We also obtained automated data from the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC). Data include: offender identifiers, offense type (all charges for which prosecution against an individual is being sought), court case number, state tracking number, date of case filing, date of disposition, and disposition of each charge. We joined data from NMCD, DPS and AOC together using personal identifiers (name, date of birth, and last four digits of the social security number).

Finally, we gathered data from the U.S. Census to examine community characteristics. This included data from the 2010 decennial Census and the 2012 American Community Survey 5-year estimates. We geocoded the address of the subject at the time supervision began using ArcGIS mapping software, and then matched the address to the census tract.

Although we were able to determine the census tract for most addresses, we were unable to map 612 cases (3.5%). Most of these (71%) were because the individuals only had an out of state address listed. An additional 98 (16%) did not have any address listed or had an address listed as "unknown" only. The remaining 80 (13%) had an address within New Mexico, but we could not find a match. Most often, this occurred because the address was invalid. In some cases, the individual was homeless (n=22) or a post office box was the only address listed. Note that in some areas, even when the address was invalid or a post office box was listed, the number of census tracts in the area was limited and we could match the individual to the correct census tract based on the city and zip code.

Dependent variables

One purpose of this study is to examine supervision violations by supervision type. The violations data from NMCD include the date of the violation, location of supervision, name of the condition violated, a brief description of the violation, and the outcome. Using these data, we calculated the **total number of violation incidents**, **time to first violation,** and **violation type**. We classified violations into thirteen binary categories based on the supervision violation codes (see Appendix A for a summary of supervision conditions). We coded a violation as a *new offense* if there was a violation noted in one of the following categories: state laws, arrest, state law, or contact. *Drug offense* includes violations of controlled substance, drug test, or drugs. Alcohol violation includes: alcohol use, alcohol, and entering bars. We classified the following violations as violations of *conditions* generally: obey probation/parole officer, counseling, supervision level, and curfew. *Other* violations includes all other types not captured in the remaining categories: failing to submit to photo, acting as an informant, not having a valid license, violating supervision in transfer location, and not submitting to searches. *Association* violations capture violations of association, gang, and forbidden association.

Finally, we include whether a **return to prison** occurred. We garnered this information from prison admissions files. Specifically, we found all admissions that occurred after the supervision start date and within 90 days of the supervision end date. We manually checked the admissions that occurred after the supervision end date to make sure they were actually connected to the supervision term. While the NMCD data have two variables that we can use to determine revocations ("admission type" and "status reason"), we did not rely on these. Past experience with the data indicates that probation revocations in particular are often classified as a "new admission" or "returning admission," even though it is a revocation. There are options to identify revocations ("prob viol abscond," "prob viol pnd chrg," and "prob viol tech") available in the admissions codes, but these are often not used for probation revocations in particular. We manually checked many of the admissions that were listed as a new or returning admission to ensure that it was actually a revocation. Ultimately, we found that over half (51%) of the revocations for probationers were listed as a new or returning admission, rather than a probation revocation.

NMCD's violation data includes a field to track the response to the violation cited. While revocations are sometimes recorded here, they are not always recorded. The most common responses recorded include "pending" followed by "guilty." The remaining values are indicative of the response (e.g., "probation

continued," "reparoled," "revoked"). In some cases, the NMCD data indicated that an individual was revoked, but we did not find that person in the prison admissions data. We manually checked those cases (approximately 200 cases) using the secure online court records data. Among the cases we found, nearly all who were revoked had been revoked to a local detention center (jail) rather than prison. Thus, for returns to *prison*, the admissions data was most accurate.

Absconding

Although we explore supervision violations generally, our primary outcome of interest is whether someone absconds while under community supervision. In this study, **"abscond"** is a binary variable coded as "0" if the individual did not abscond and "1" if the individual absconded at least once. Per policy CD-052800, the New Mexico Corrections Department defines absconders as "any probationer or parolee who, while under the supervision of the PPD, changes residence or leaves the jurisdiction without permission and/or ceases reporting or is otherwise not available for supervision and lacks a valid, legal excuse for not being available" (p.2). This definition guided our construction of absconding; it is consistent with our prior report (Denman et al., 2010).

Whether someone absconded was garnered from NMCD's supervision violation data. We first identified violations of the following standard conditions that are often associated with absconding: "personal status" or "status," "reporting" or "monthly reporting," "home visits" or "visits," and "travel permit" (see Appendix A for a description of each of these conditions). However, violations of these conditions do not always reflect absconding. For example, a reporting violation could be indicative of failing to disclose drug use or otherwise being untruthful. A status violation could refer to absconding, but could also be used when someone changes jobs without permission. Without reading each violation description for more details, it is impossible to determine which aspect of the status condition was violated.

Thus, we also searched for key words in the violation description field that would indicate absconding. These include: "fugitive," "abscond" and all variations of the word, "whereabouts unknown," "failure to report," "did not report," "last contact," "not heard from," "missed visit," "missed appointment," and "invalid address." When these words were found in combination with the condition violations noted above, we coded it as a likely absconsion. We also flagged other violation types that had these words in the description as possible absconding. We then identified those violations that were likely absconding (e.g., combination of reporting violation and the words "fugitive" or "absconder"), and those that needed further exploration (e.g., status violation without any additional flags). These we manually checked by reading the violation descriptions and classifying the case as absconding or not.

We did not include the following as absconding: cited for being late to appointment, change in address or leaving county but whereabouts known (e.g., person came in for appointment and it was disclosed that the person stayed at an unapproved residence or was arrested in a county they were not supposed to be in), and those violations where we were unable to determine whether the violation was absconsion or something else (e.g., a status violation that did not specify which status was violated). Thus, it is possible that some absconders were not identified as such.

Next, we calculated **time to absconding**. Some individuals had multiple violations for absconding; therefore, we used the date of the first incident of absconding to measure time to absconding. This was recorded in number of days from the date that the supervision period began.

Independent variables

The remaining data include the control and independent variables examined in bivariate analyses of violations generally, as well as absconding, and in the multivariate analyses of absconding. These include demographics, social ties, stability, current offense, criminal history, supervision characteristics, and community characteristics.

Demographics

We include the following demographic variables as controls: *age*, *gender,* and *race/ethnicity.* These data were captured from the NMCD data if available; if not available, it was supplemented with data from DPS and AOC. *Age* represents the age at the time the individual began supervision. *Gender* is a binary variable coded as "1" if male and "0" if female. *Race* is coded as White non-Hispanic, African-American non-Hispanic, Native-American non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and other non-Hispanic. Most individuals with a Hispanic ethnicity are White.

Social capital

Prior research suggests that those who have more pro-social ties are more likely to desist from criminal activity (Petersilia, 2005; Uggen, Wakefield and Western, 2005). Thus, we hypothesize that offenders with weaker pro-social ties will have worse outcomes. We include the following measures of social capital, all garnered from NMCD's Risk Needs Assessment (RNA) data: *employment*, *gang membership, and negative associations*. We chose the most complete RNA closest to the supervision date to construct these measures. *Employment* is coded as "1" if the individual was identified as unemployed or underemployed and "0" if not identified as such. *Gang membership* is coded as "1" if there was any suspected or confirmed gang membership and "0" otherwise. The variable *negative associations* is drawn from an item on the RNA that measures the quality of companions. There are two responses: no adverse relationships and occasional or completely negative associations. Negative associations is coded as a "1" if negative associations are indicated and "0" if not.

Stability

We anticipate that individuals who are less stable would be more likely to violate the terms of their supervision including absconding from supervision. We include multiple measures of stability, gathered from the RNA data. First, we include the *number of address changes*. If there were 2 or more in the last year, it was coded as "1" and "0" if one or none. Conversations with NMCD staff indicate that there is a strong relationship between drug use and absconding. Thus, we include the variable *known drug problems*, coded as "1" if indicated and "0" if not. *Reported mental illness* is coded as "1" if the individual is identified as having a mental illness or identified as having a history of mental problems in the last five years, and "0" if not. This RNA item can be populated from both unofficial (e.g., self-report)

or official sources (e.g., official evaluation/diagnosis); thus, this item represents likely current or history of mental health problems. Finally, we include whether there is a *history of absconding*; this is coded as "1" if indicated and "0" if not indicated.

Current offense

Although there is concern about violent offenders, the literature suggests that property offenders are more likely to recidivate (Grattet et al., 2009; Rosenfeld, Wallman and Fornango, 2005). Thus, we expect that those with property offenses will have poorer outcomes than those who have no evidence of property offending. Therefore, we compare outcomes of those with *property offenses* to those with other types of offenses (*violent offenses*, *drug offenses*, *public order offenses*, and *other offenses*). This is recorded as a series of binary variables, with "1" indicating that this is the most serious current offense and "0" if it is not.

The current offense is available for parolees in the NMCD release files and reflects the most serious offense. The current offense for probationers is located in a separate file, and it includes all of the conviction charges. The NMCD assigns a severity code to each statute; we used this information to determine the most serious offense to ensure comparability across supervision types.

Criminal history

Criminal history is typically a consistent and strong predictor of poor criminal justice outcomes. Thus, we examine measures of criminal history drawn from three sources: the NMCD, DPS, and AOC. These include *prior offense types* from all three sources of data. In addition to a variable which indicates whether there were any prior offenses, we constructed five binary variables summarizing the types of prior offense (violent crimes, property crimes, drug offenses, DWI, and all other types of offenses). Each of these is coded as "1" if there was any prior arrest, conviction, or incarceration for the offense and "0" if not. In addition, we calculate *the total number of prior arrests*.

Supervision Characteristics

Next, we include several variables measuring supervision characteristics. These variables are all available in the NMCD data. First, we extracted the *assessed risk level* at the beginning of supervision from the RNA; these include four values that vary from minimum risk to extreme risk. The RNA is intended to assess the risk that the individual will recidivate, and it is administered at the time of intake and at regular intervals thereafter. The RNA scores are based on a variety of static and dynamic risk factors (e.g., address changes, employment status, academic skills, substance use, and criminal history). We expect that those who are assessed at a higher risk level will be more likely to violate their conditions of supervision and to abscond.

The overall risk score is used to assign an individual to a supervision level. However, probation/parole officers can override the level of risk calculated from the RNA. We have captured this override score in a variable that measures *level of supervision* at beginning of probation/parole. This includes five values: minimum, medium, high, extreme, and extreme special programs. Extreme special indicates that the

individual is slated to engage in special supervision programs, including Intensive Supervision, Sex Offender, Community Corrections, and Drug Court.

In addition, we include: *supervision type* (whether the individual is serving a probation, parole, or dual term of supervision), *total number of special supervision requirements,* whether the individual is required to *register as a sex offender,* and whether the person is subject to *GPS monitoring*. The last two variables are binary, coded as "1" for required and "0" if not required.

Extant research regarding supervision conditions provides mixed results suggesting that different forms of monitoring have different outcomes. For example, intensive supervised probation (ISP) has been associated with increased revocations due to close monitoring resulting in the detection of technical violations (Lowenkamp et al. 2010). On the other hand, studies suggest electronic monitoring results in lower levels of technical violations as well as absconding (see, e.g., Padgett, Bales and Blomberg 2006). Prior research suggests that community notification is associated with quicker rearrests for sex offenders, which may be due to increased identification and monitoring of sex offenders subjected to this special condition (Freeman 2012). We expect that individuals who are subject to increased monitoring, such as those supervised as extreme supervision/special programs, sex offender registration, and GPS monitoring will be less likely to abscond due to this increased surveillance, though they may be more likely to have technical violations due to increased opportunities for detection.

Conversely, we expect that those who pose a greater risk would be more likely to violate conditions of supervision, including absconding. Thus, those with a higher level of assessed risk, those with a greater number of special supervision requirements, and those supervised under parole or dual supervision represent more serious offenders, and therefore, would be more susceptible to both violations generally and absconding.

Community characteristics

Community characteristics are an important component of this study**.** Using census data, we explore the influence of community disadvantage and residential instability on probation/parole success, particularly absconding at the census tract level. Prior research suggests that neighborhood characteristics play a role in reoffending behavior, even after controlling for individual characteristics (see e.g., Kubrin and Stewart, 2006). Social disorganization theory posits that disadvantaged areas are less capable of exercising informal social control (Bursik, 1988) while neighborhoods with increased cultural diversity may be less cohesive resulting in decreased social control (Klein and Merritt, 2014). We explore whether this would extend to absconding behavior.

From the census data, we constructed measures of economic disadvantage and social control. *Racial heterogeneity* is calculated using Blau's Diversity Index as described in Klein and Merritt (2014). They explain that "the index is calculated by squaring the percent of each mutually exclusive racial/ethnic group residing in an area expressed as a fraction, then summing the squares and subtracting the total from 1.00" (p. 99). Lower values indicate homogeneity while higher values represent diversity. We also include several measures of economic disadvantage: *percent of population on public assistance, percent*

of population below poverty level, percent unemployed, and *percent female head of household*. Other measures that may reflect informal social controls include: *residential mobility* (percent in renter-occupied housing and percent of population that has moved in last year)*, population density* per square mile*,* and *racial heterogeneity.*

Analytic methods

The remainder of this report is dedicated to the analysis of these data. We begin by presenting select characteristics of the sample overall and by supervision type (probation, parole, or dual supervision). We then provide an overview of violations including rates of violations, types of violations, and time to violation overall and by supervision type in Section III. In Section IV, we explore returns to prison. We examine this information by supervision type as well as by violation type.

We then examine absconding behavior specifically in Section V. We begin by exploring the relationship between absconding, time to absconding, as well as violations overall by supervision type and each of the independent and control variables. We present the results of multivariate analyses which assess factors associated with absconding, controlling for other variables. We calculated two different multivariate models. First, we computed a linear mixed logistic regression model to determine factors associated with absconding behavior. Logistic regression models are appropriate for dichotomous/binary dependent variables (in this case, absconded = 1 and not-absconded = 0). Logistic regression estimates the probability or odds that the binary outcome variable equals one and allows for a discussion of coefficients in terms of risk ratios (that is, logistic regression allows for the calculation of the proportion of observations who are expected to have y =1). Furthermore, since the data were measured at different levels (individual and community), a multilevel model is most appropriate.

Second, to assess time to and likelihood of failure (absconding), we estimated piecewise exponential survival models. This statistical model allows us to assess the relationship between survival time and the covariates. Time to absconding is classic "event history" or "survival analysis" data in that it incorporates two sets of information: whether a person failed and the time until failure. Unlike logistic regression which treats the time until the event (absconding) as a given, survival analysis incorporates that information into the estimation of the model coefficients. These coefficients are then interpreted as hazard ratios, which describe the ratio of an event (absconding) per time unit (and not the cumulative risk of an event, as with logistic regression). Survival analysis is particularly useful when there is variation in the amount of time subjects are exposed to the risk of an event (for example, when offender sentences vary and they have more or less time to potentially abscond).

We include a number of maps in this report. These illustrate the number of individuals on supervision within each county in New Mexico, and within each census tract in New Mexico. In addition, we provide maps illustrating the proportion of absconders within the supervised population by county and by census tract. When reporting this information, we classified the data using one of two methods. First, when the data were normally distributed (the mean and median were similar and a histogram of the data indicated a bell curve), we used the standard deviation method to describe the data. When the

data were not normally distributed, but there were clear breaks in the data, we used the Jenks method to classify the data.

Section II: Description of Sample

There were a total of 18,029 individuals in our sample. The majority of those individuals were on probation only (80%, n=14,379), while the remaining 3,650 individuals were on parole (13%) or dual supervision (7%). A slightly greater proportion (52%) of individuals began supervision in 2011; the remaining began supervision in 2012. By the last date of the study period, the average number of days individuals had been supervised was 619 (s.d. =341). However, as would be expected, the average number of days of supervision was higher for parolees or those under dual supervision (approximately 616 and 753 days, respectively) than for probationers (607 days). Below, we illustrate select measures of the sample. Additional information is provided in Appendix B.

Demographics

As shown in Table II.1, most individuals under state supervision were male (77%); more than half of those in our sample were Hispanic (54%). Over one-third were between the ages of 25 and 34, with an average age of 34 years old. However, these characteristics did vary by supervision type. There were significantly more males among parolees and those under dual supervision than among probationers. Although probationers and parolees were very similar in terms of Hispanic ethnicity, those supervised under dual status were significantly more likely to be of Hispanic descent (54% and 50% compared to 62%). Furthermore, a smaller proportion of parolees were White and a greater proportion were Native American compared to probationers and those under dual status. Finally, parolees and those under dual status were significantly older than those supervised under probation. One-quarter (26%) of probationers were under the age of 25, while fewer than 12% of parolees and dual status were 24 years old or less.

Table II.1 Sample Demographics

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual	All
Gender	(N=14282)	(N=2209)	(N=1328)	(N=17819)
Male	74.4%	88.0%	85.2%***	76.9%
Race	(N=14379)	(N=2322)	(N=1328)***	(N=18029)
Hispanic	53.7%	50.0%	61.6%	53.8%
White	29.4%	23.0%	25.2%	28.3%
African American	5.3%	5.8%	7.6%	5.5%
Native American	10.1%	14.7%	5.4%	10.4%
Other	1.5%	6.4%	0.3%	1.7%
Age of Offender	(N=14268)	(N=2191)	(N=1309)	(N=17787)
Mean (s.d.)	33.24 (11.12)	36.87 (10.59)	35.56 (10.06)***	33.86 (11.06)
Age of Offender	(N=14268)	(N=2191)	(N=1309)	(N=17787)
18-24	26.2%	10.3%	11.7%***	23.2%
25-34	35.9%	37.6%	43.1%	36.7%
35-44	19.9%	27.9%	25.1%	21.3%
45-54	12.9%	17.6%	15.3%	13.7%
55 or older	4.9%	6.6%	4.9%	5.1%

***p≤.001, *p≤.05

Social capital

We include three measures of social capital: employment, known negative associations, and suspected or validated gang membership. The majority of the supervised population was either unemployed or underemployed. As may be expected, probationers were less likely than either parolees or those under dual supervision to be unemployed/underemployed (66% compared to 75% and 77%, respectively). These differences were statistically significant.

Just over half (52%) of the probationers were identified as having negative associations. A little under half of the parolees (45%) and those under dual supervision (47%) were identified as such. Conversely, parolees and those under dual supervision were much more likely than probationers to be identified as having some gang affiliation, either suspected or validated. These differences were statistically significant. (See Appendix B: Table B.1 for more details).

Stability

We gathered multiple measures of stability. First is whether the individual moved multiple times in the past year. Between 41 and 43% of those in our sample had moved two or more times within the past year. We found no differences by supervision type.

Over half of the sample (59%) was identified as having drug problems. Probationers were significantly more likely to have a recorded drug problem (60%) compared to parolees (56%) or those under dual supervision (53%). Approximately 10% of the sample was identified by their risk/needs assessment as having likely experienced some mental health problems. There were no significant differences by supervision type.

The final measure of stability is whether there is a history of absconding. Overall, just 4% of those in our sample absconded previously. This varied significantly by supervision type. While just 3% of probationers had a history of absconding, 8% of parolees and 7% of those under dual supervision had absconded from community supervision in the past. (See Appendix B: Table B.2 for more details).

Current offense

In Table II.2 below, we illustrate the most serious current offense recorded for individuals in our sample. The most serious offense was a violent offense for approximately one-third of the sample. This varied by supervision status with those under dual status being much more likely to have been convicted of a violent offense (44%) relative to probationers (32%) or parolees (36%). Despite this finding, violent offenses comprised the most frequent type of offense, regardless of supervision category.

Approximately 30% of probationers were convicted of a property crime, while 19% of parolees and 25% of those under dual supervision were being supervised for having committed a property offense. Drug offenses were the third most frequent type of most serious offense overall, with little variation based on supervision type. A greater proportion of parolees (14%) were convicted of a DWI compared to probationers (9%). Probationers were more likely to have a conviction for other offenses (6%) compared to parolees (3%) and those under dual supervision (2%).

We could not find a current offense for nearly 8% of parolees; this proportion exceeds the unknown rate for probationers and those under dual supervision. Information about current offense was garnered from three different NMCD datasets. For probationers and those under dual supervision, the current offense was available in a dataset that includes the entire cohort of those under those forms of supervision. While current offense was available for some parolees in that dataset as well, parolee offense data was primarily gathered from prison admissions and releases files to determine the current offense. In some cases, the individual did not appear in any of these files, and in others, we could not match the dates of the supervision period to the dates of incarceration. We manually checked some cases to determine the reasons for missing data. In some cases, we found that the supervision type was incorrect. For example, in one case an individual was sentenced to prison followed by a parole term, but never actually went to prison because the incarceration term was suspended and the parole term was replaced by probation. However, the person was listed as a parolee and never appeared in the probation cohort data.

Table II.2 Most Serious Current Offense

	Probationers (N=14377)	Parolees (N=2322)	Dual (N=1328)	All (N=18027)
Most serious current offense				
Violent offense	31.9%	36.3%	43.9%	33.9%***
Property offense	29.9%	18.6%	25.4%	28.1%
Drug offense	21.8%	19.9%	19.0%	21.4%
DWI	8.7%	14.0%	10.1%	9.5%
Other offense	5.8%	2.9%	1.6%	5.1%
Unknown/not recorded	2.0%	8.4%	0.1%	2.7%

***p≤.001

Prior offense

Nearly all of the individuals in our sample had one or more prior arrests and court cases. The average number of prior arrests was significantly higher for parolees and those under dual supervision (7.51 and 8.02 respectively) compared to probationers (4.95). However, probationers had the greatest average number of prior court cases. Relatively few probationers had been incarcerated previously; just 11.3% had one or more prior incarcerations compared to approximately 35% of parolees and those under dual supervision. For more information, see Appendix B: Tables B.3 to B.5.

Supervision characteristics

Individuals supervised under parole or dual status were less likely to be assessed as a “minimum” risk compared to probationers. Additionally, while 50% of probationers were assessed as medium risk, just 31% of parolees and 27% of dual status individuals were assessed as “medium” risk. Almost one-third of parolees and dual status individuals were calculated as having an “extreme” risk of recidivating, while just 6% of probationers were determined to be at “extreme” risk.

However, once overrides were taken into account, the distribution changed. While the assessed level of risk prior to overrides is indicative of calculated risk based on risk criteria, the final risk level represents the actual level of supervision at the beginning of community supervision. Fewer than 2% of probationers were designated "minimum" risk; instead, the majority (62%) were classified as "medium" risk. The most common risk level for parolees and those under dual status was "extreme special programs." Importantly, many individuals whose calculated risk score was low (minimum or medium) were reclassified as "extreme special programs."

Table II.3 Supervision Characteristics

	Probationers N=14021	Parolees N=2150	Dual N=1295	All N=17466
Assessed Risk Level				
Minimum	23.6%	4.4%	6.2%***	20.0%
Medium	49.6%	30.8%	26.9%	45.6%
High	20.7%	33.8%	36.4%	23.4%
Extreme	6.1%	31.0%	30.6%	11.0%
Level of Supervision				
Minimum	1.8%	1.0%	0.8%***	1.6%
Medium	62.3%	21.6%	14.2%	53.7%
High	27.3%	29.7%	29.4%	27.8%
Extreme	3.2%	10.7%	13.0%	4.9%
Extreme special programs	5.4%	35.9%	42.5%	12.0%
Number of special conditions	N=14379	N=2322	N=1328	N=18029
Mean (s.d.)	6.97 (3.85)	6.51 (4.09)	14.28 (6.08)***	7.45 (4.52)
Special supervision requirements	N=14379	N=2322	N=1328	N=18029
GPS monitoring	0.8%	25.9%	32.5%***	6.4%
Sex offender registration	1.1%	3.1%	4.4%***	1.6%

***p≤.001

In addition to examining the level of risk, we calculated the number of special conditions each individual was required to meet, as well as whether there were specific special conditions of GPS monitoring or sex offender registration. Relative to probationers and parolees, those under dual supervision had a significantly greater number of special conditions they were required to meet. Very few probationers were required to wear an ankle monitor; less than 1% of probationers were subject to GPS monitoring, while 26% of parolees and 33% of dual supervision individuals were subject to electronic monitoring. While relatively few individuals were required to register as a sex offender, this was a much more common requirement for those supervised under parole (3%) and dual supervision (4%) than probation (1%). Differences were statistically significant in all categories of supervision characteristics.

Location of supervision

We expect that there will be a relationship between spatial conditions and supervision violations, and more specifically, absconding. The number of individuals supervised in the community generally reflects

the population of the area. That is, areas with a greater number of people typically have a greater number of individuals under supervision. However, this is not always the case (see Table B.9, Appendix B). We standardized the number of individuals under supervision by calculating the overall supervised population per 10,000 people. When standardized per capita, we found that the supervised population was not evenly distributed throughout New Mexico. As illustrated in Map II.1 below, Harding County and Catron County had the lowest concentration of supervised individuals relative to the population. Curry County had the highest concentration of supervised individuals followed by Roosevelt and Colfax Counties.

Map II.1 Supervised Population by County



Besides having the greatest concentration of supervised individuals overall (143 per 10,000), Curry County also had the greatest concentration of probationers (117 per 10,000), but not the highest concentration of parolees or dual status. Instead, Sandoval (26 per 10,000) and De Baca (25 per 10,000) Counties experienced the highest concentration of parolees and were in the top three along with Otero County for concentration of dual status individuals.

The total number of individuals under supervision was highest in both Bernalillo County and San Juan County. While they do not have the highest concentration of individuals under supervision relative to the population, they do rank in the top one-third of the state. Catron County had both one of the fewest absolute number of individuals under supervision as well as the lowest density of supervised individuals overall. (For more details, see Appendix B: Table B.9).

We also examined the concentration of the supervised population by census tract within counties (see Map II.2 below). Several census tracts within Bernalillo County experienced above average concentrations of supervised individuals. These include tracts located near the neighborhoods of Barelas, Near North Valley, and La Mesa in Albuquerque. In addition, the census tract located west of Bosque Farms in Valencia County had a higher density of supervised individuals than other tracts within the state. Finally, one tract in Otero County was among the densest: this tract is located within the center of Alamogordo.

Census tracts in a number of counties had relatively small concentrations of supervised individuals. These were located primarily in counties on the west side of the state (San Juan, McKinley, Catron, Grant, and Socorro Counties). Others were found in Los Alamos, Santa Fe, Bernalillo, Otero, and Dona Ana Counties. On the eastern side of the state, one tract within Curry County had a relatively small density of supervised individuals.

Map II.2 Supervised Population by Census Tract in New Mexico



Community Characteristics

As illustrated in the maps above, the supervised population differs by geographic location, with some living in greater or smaller concentrations across counties and within census tracts. In order to capture these differences and assess the influence of location on violations and absconding, we include a variety of measures representing diversity and community disadvantage (social disorganization). The first measure included is racial heterogeneity. This variable ranges from 0 (no heterogeneity) to 1; the average for the sample overall was .65, with a range of .64 (parolees) to .66 (dual supervision). In other words, those under dual supervision were more likely to live in areas characterized by greater racial heterogeneity relative to parolees. Although these averages differed from one another significantly by supervision type, the median was .67, regardless of supervision type. Furthermore, there was a large variation in the extent of racial heterogeneity, with some individuals living in areas characterized by little difference (.03) to areas that were very diverse (.81).

We also included measures typically designed to assess economic disadvantage. These include: female head of household, poverty, public assistance, and unemployment rates. On average, those in our sample lived in areas where approximately 16% of households were headed by a female. Those supervised under dual status were slightly more likely to live in such areas on average (16.25%) than probationers (15.95%). The average proportion of households in poverty was approximately 21% for those in our sample, regardless of supervision type. Individuals in our sample lived in areas where an average of 16.89% of households received public assistances; however, this differed by supervision type from 16.68% (parolees) to 17.68% (dual status). Those in our sample lived in areas that had around 10% unemployment on average, with no significant differences by supervision type.

We included three measures of residential instability: the percent of renter occupied housing, percent of individuals who lived in a different location in the prior year, and population density. Those in our sample lived in areas that averaged 35% renter occupied housing, 16% residential mobility, and approximately 2,472 individuals per square mile. Differences by supervision type were statistically significant, with parolees living in areas characterized by relatively less renter-occupied housing, less mobility, and fewer individuals per square mile.

Table B.8 Community Characteristics by Supervision Type

Census variables:	Probationers (N=14380)	Parolees (N=2325)	Dual (N=1324)	All (N=17416)
Racial Heterogeneity Index				
Min-max	.03-.81	.05-.81	.06-.81	.03-.81
Mean (s.d.)	.65(.12)	.64(.13)	.66(.10)***	.65 (.12)
Median	.67	.67	.67	.67
% female head of household				
Min-max	2.43%-38.13%	2.43%-38.13%	4.81%-36.11%	2.43-38.13
Mean (s.d.)	15.95%(5.14)	16.19%(5.09)	16.25%(5.03)*	16.01% (5.12)
Median	15.61%	16.19%	16.25%	16.01%
% poverty households				
Min-max	0 %-61.20%	0%-61.2%	1.1%-51.00%	0 %-61.2%
Mean (s.d.)	21.30%(10.07)	21.11%(9.57)	21.05%(9.66)	21.26% (9.98)
Median	20.5%	20.5%	20.1%	20.3%
% household public asst	13855			
Min-max	0-46.3%	0-46.03	0-45.79%	0-46.03%
Mean (sd)	16.85% (8.82)	16.68% (8.32)	17.68% (8.88)	16.89 (8.77)**
Median	16.56%	15.71%	16.55%	16.54%
% unemployed				
Min-max	0%-35.14%	0.76%-32.60%	0.76%-31.25%	0%-35.14%
Mean (s.d.)	9.84%(4.81)	9.82%(4.66)	9.96%(4.41)	9.85% (4.76)
Median	9.13%	9.47%	9.47%	9.13%
% renter occupied housing				
Min-max	2.84%-99.38%	2.84%-99.38%	2.84%-95.67%	2.84%-99.38%
Mean (s.d.)	35.41%(18.02)	32.96%(15.66)	33.98%(15.24)	34.99% (17.55)***
Median	32.06%	30.09%	32.64%	31.71%
% moved 1 year ago				
Min-max	0%-52.77%	0%-52.77%	0%-41.28%	0%-52.77%
Mean (s.d.)	16.13%(8.55)	15.06%(7.69)	16.21%(7.79)	15.99% (8.39)***
Median	14.72	13.91	14.72	14.48
Population per square mile	13855	2252	1310	17417
Min-Max	0.3-12458.6	.5-12458.6	0.3-12458.6***	0.3-12458.6
Mean (s.d)	2535.82	2141.53	2364.69	2471.96
Median	(2615.65)	(2427.4)	(2403.56)	(2579.99)
	1695.6	1200.95	1695.3	1695.3

***p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05

Section III: Violations

Performance on community supervision is measured by technical violations and revocations. In this section, we focus on violation rates, the types of violations incurred, and time to first violation.

Violation rates

Over one-third (36%) of those under supervision did not commit any violations over the study period. This varied, though, by supervision type. Those supervised under dual supervision were both more likely to have one or more violations (73%), and had a greater average number of violations (mean=2.21) than those supervised under probation only (64%; mean=1.95) or parole only (61%; mean=1.25). These differences were statistically significant. These results can be found in Table III.1 below.

Table III.1 Number of Violations by Supervision Type

	Probationers (N=14379)	Parolees (N=2322)	Dual (N=1328)	All (N=18029)
Number of Violations				
0	36.3%	39.4%	27.3%***	36.1%
1	18.2%	27.5%	19.8%	19.5%
2	13.9%	16.8%	17.0%	14.5%
3	10.9%	8.7%	12.0%	10.7%
4 or more	20.7%	7.5%	23.9%	19.2%
Average number of violations	1.95 (2.30)	1.25 (1.48)	2.21 (2.28)***	1.88 (2.22)

***p≤.001

Violation types

As shown in Table III.2 below, among all of those under community supervision with a supervision violation, the most common type of violation was for a drug offense (60%) followed by absconding/failure to report (52%). Notably, nearly half (49%) of those with a violation had committed a new offense.

We found significant differences for nearly all of the conditions by supervision type, indicating that individuals commit these violations at different rates. Those supervised under dual status committed significantly more violations than those under probation or parole for a variety of violation types. These include: committing a new offense (53%), drug offenses (65%), employment violations (13%), failing to complete specific conditions (i.e., counseling, meeting curfew, or abiding by specific conditions related to supervision level; 45%), and violations of association (e.g. associating with those likely to be detrimental to supervision; 28%). They were also more likely to have violations for failure to pay fees, fines, or costs (12%) relative to parolees (2%), but were similar in this regard to those on probation (11%).

Table III.2 Violation Types by Supervision Type

Violation type	Probationers (N=9154)	Parolees (N=1406)	Dual (N=967)	All (N=11527)
New offense	49.7%	45.5%	52.8%***	49.3%
Fail to report to parole/abscond	52.4%	47.8%	51.2%***	51.8%
Drug offense	61.3%	52.3%	64.6%***	60.4%
Employment	9.8%	12.8%	13.3%***	10.5%
Alcohol	39.6%	37.4%	40.6%	39.4%
Conditions (obey PO, counseling, etc.)	29.5%	7.3%	44.9%***	28.1%
Weapons	6.4%	6.5%	7.9%	6.5%
Probation costs	11.3%	1.9%	12.0%***	10.2%
Other (photo, license, informant, etc.)	1.1%	12.0%	7.3%***	3%
Association	19.3%	19.8%	27.9%***	20.1%
Reporting, not absconding related	2.9%	1.4%	2.5%	2.7%
Status, not absconding related	12.4%	9.7%	10.8%**	11.9%
Visits, not absconding related	1.6%	1.2%	1.6%	1.5%

***p≤.001, *p≤.05

Those supervised under parole status only were significantly more likely to have a violation for some "other" type of offense (12%) relative to those under probation (1%) or dual status (7%). "Other" offenses include violations for failure to submit to a photo and fingerprinting, acting as an informant, failure to submit to a warrantless search, and failing to abide by rules when under supervision in another state, among others.

Probationers had the highest rate of absconding (52%). While they were slightly more likely than those under dual supervision to abscond (52% compared to 51%), they were significantly more likely to abscond than those under parole supervision only (48%). They were also more likely to have reporting and status violations that were not related to absconding, though this relationship was only statistically significant for non-absconding status violations.

Average time to violation

Next, we explored the average time to violation and whether this varies by supervision type. Of all of those under supervision, the greatest proportion of individuals violated their supervision within 0-30 days (24%), while the average number of days was approximately 172. Interestingly, while 27% of probationers violated within 30 days, 19% of parolees and just 12% of those under dual supervision did so. The greatest proportion of both parolees and those under dual status violated between 91 and 180 days after supervision began (22% and 21%, respectively). Additionally, over half of the sample who violated did so within six months. However, while 67% of both probationers and parolees had incurred one or more violations within that time, 56% of those under dual supervision status had one or more violations within six months.

Comparisons of the average number of days to violation reveal that parolees violated more quickly on average (about 161 days), while those under dual status took longer before violating (about 219 days). Probationers were in between, with an average of 169 days. However, these averages are influenced by

the outliers. In other words, some probationers violated long after they began supervision and this influenced the average value. The median number of days to violation reflect the categorical days to violation, with probationers violating most quickly (approximately 96 days), followed by parolees (109 days) and then dual supervision (150 days). These results are presented in Table III.3 below.

Table III.3 Days to any violation

	Probationers (N=9154)	Parolees (N=1406)	Dual (N=967)	All (N=11527)
Days to violation* **				
0-30	26.6%	18.6%	12.0%	24.4%
31-60	11.6%	15.2%	12.0%	12.1%
61-90	10.3%	11.1%	10.7%	10.5%
91-180	19.1%	22.4%	21.3%	19.7%
181-270	10.9%	14.5%	14.8%	11.7%
271-365	7.6%	7.6%	9.9%	7.8%
366-730	11.0%	9.5%	16.0%	11.2%
731+	2.8%	1.1%	3.3%	2.6%
Mean* (s.d.)**	169.21 (201.12)	160.75 (167.16)	218.45 (211.18)	172.30 (198.68)
Median	95.50	109.00	150.00	101.00

***p≤.001

Section IV. Revocation to Prison

Technical violations of supervision are addressed in a number of ways, ranging from continued community supervision to full revocation and incarceration (NMCD Policy CD-057200 and Policy CD-052800). These graduated sanctions are intended to provide incentives for compliance as well as sanctions for non-compliance (CD-052800). Probation/parole officers (PPOs) are required to submit a violation report for most violations (CD-052801). A handful of non-repetitive violations may be noted in the case file rather than reported (CD-052801).

Absconding is considered a serious violation of supervision. Policy dictates that a bench warrant be issued for individuals determined to be absconders (CD-052800). Parole absconders have a presumptive recommendation for revocation or participation in the Sanctioned Parole Violator Program (SPVP) (Form CD-057201.3). SPVP includes returning to state custody for 30, 45, 60, or 90 days, followed by a return to parole (CD-057200). However, parolees are not allowed to participate in this program if charged/detained for a new felony charge or probation violation

Although sanctions through the SPVP or full revocation may be sought, recovered absconders who do not commit a new crime and who are not considered a public risk may be recommended for continued community supervision (CD-052802). Individuals who are arrested, whether due to absconding or some other violation, are subject to probable cause hearings. During the course of this hearing, it is determined whether the individual poses a risk to the public, which is a strong determinant of how the violation is addressed. Alternatives to revocation include, but are not limited to, imposing special conditions, increasing the intensity of supervision, or placing the individual into a community residential facility (CD-052803).

In this section, we focus on revocations. We tracked any admission to prison during the supervision period, including those sentenced for a short time (SVPV) and those fully revoked from any type of supervision. We found that 29.6% of those who committed one or more violations were revoked to prison; this represents 20.7% of the full sample. Overall, the proportion of individuals revoked to prison who absconded was nearly identical to the proportion revoked who committed a new offense (36%). As one would expect, the proportion of those who committed only other technical violations were revoked at a much lower rate (15%).

Revocations varied significantly by supervision type. Parolees and those under dual supervision status were significantly more likely to be revoked to prison than probationers (76%, 72% and 18%, respectively). Moreover, while approximately 36% of all those with one or more absconding/failure to report violations were revoked to prison at some point, parolees and dual status individuals with absconding violations were much more likely to be revoked than probationers with absconding violations. We observe similar patterns among those who committed a new offense. Likewise, while only 15% of those who committed only technical violations (not related to absconding) were revoked to prison, the disparities by supervision type were significant. Parolees were much more likely to be revoked for other technical violations (56%) followed by those under dual status (40%); just 5% of probationers who committed only technical violations were revoked to prison.

Table IV.1 Revocations among those who violated terms of supervision

	Probationers (N=9154)	Parolees (N=1406)	Dual (N=967)	All (N=11527)
Percent revoked among those with violations	17.9%	76.2%	72.4%***	29.6%
Revoked by violation type				
Abscond	23.5%	85.1%	86.5%***	35.7%
New Offense	25.1%	82.7%	80.0%***	36.4%
Other technical violation only	5.0%	56.3%	39.9%***	14.6%

***p≤.001

Some individuals violated the conditions of their supervision multiple times. This is an important factor to consider, as revocation is more likely for those who violate repeatedly. Below (Table IV.2), we illustrate the average number of absconsions, new offenses, and technical violations among those revoked to prison. These averages suggest that many people commit multiple offenses before they are revoked to prison. As may be expected, individuals who were revoked that only had a history of technical violations had a greater average number of violations (2.25) than those who had a history of absconding (1.67) or new offenses (1.38).

We also found that the average number of each type of violation among those revoked varied by supervision type. Generally, parolees committed fewer violations before being revoked to prison and probationers committed more; those under dual status were in between. However, among those who had only technical violations (no absconding or new offenses), probationers and those under dual supervision were more similar to one another with an average of 2.63 and 2.66 violations, respectively.

Also displayed in Table IV.2 below is the proportion of individuals revoked by the number of times they had violations for absconding, new offenses, and all other violations. As illustrated in the table, there were no statistically significant differences for the sample overall by number of violation events and proportion revoked for absconding or new offenses; however, there were differences among those with only technical violations. As would be expected, the proportion of individuals who had only technical violations (not absconding or new offenses) and who were revoked to prison increased significantly with the number of violations. While 12% of the sample overall who had a single technical violation were revoked at some point, approximately 18% of those with three or more technical violations spent some time in prison.

We also observed differences by supervision type. Among those with absconding violations, we found that the proportion of individuals who were revoked to prison significantly increased with each increase in the number of absconding events among probationers and those under dual supervision, but not for parolees. However, all of those under dual supervision or parole who committed four or more absconding violations were revoked to prison.

Interestingly, there was no clear pattern associated with new offenses. While the proportion of probationers with new offenses who were revoked to prison increased from one incident (23%) to three incidents (35%), the proportion revoked then declined slightly (33%). Additionally, while the differences in the proportion of offenders revoked to prison was significantly different for each category of number of new offense violations for those under dual supervision, there was no consistent pattern. Finally, the proportion of parolees with new offenses who were revoked to prison varied with the number of new offense incidents, however, there was no clear pattern and the differences were not statistically significant.

Among those who committed only technical violations, the proportion of those revoked increased as the number of violations increased, regardless of supervision type. These differences were statistically significant.

Notably, regardless of the type of violation, the proportion of probationers who were revoked to prison was significantly lower than either parolees or those under dual supervision. This may suggest that probationers are not deemed a risk to the public as often as parolees and those under dual supervision. However, it is important to point out that we tracked only admissions to prison, not admissions to local detention centers (jails).

Table IV.2 Number of Violations and Revocation

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual	All
Violation type	**Average number of violations among those revoked**			
Absconding	1.83 (1.08) (n=1128)	1.36 (.68) (n=572)	1.67 (.93) (n=428)***	1.67 (.98) (n=2128)
New offenses	1.46 (.75) (n=1144)	1.19 (.53) (n=517)	1.39 (.68) (n=409)***	1.38 (.70) (n=2070)
Technical violations only	2.63 (2.10) (n=110)	1.88 (1.13) (n=211)	2.66 (2.01) (n=85)***	2.25 (1.68) (n=406)
	Returns to prison by number of violations			
Absconding				
One	21.1% (N=2674) ***	84.3% (N=492)	82.3% (N=283) **	35.1% (N=3449)
Two	24.7% (N=1334)	87.6% (N=137)	90.9% (N=143)	35.9% (N=1614)
Three	28.4% (N=504)	81.8% (N=33)	92.7% (N=55)	37.3% (N=592)
Four or more	31.8% (N=289)	100.0% (N=10)	100.0% (N=14)	37.1% (N=313)
New Offenses				
One	23.3% (N=3256)***	82.6% (N=534)	77.8% (n=361)*	35.6% (N=4151)
Two	28.6% (n=960)	85.7% (N=70)	89.6% (N=115)	38.3% (N=1145)
Three	34.5% (N=252)	68.8% (N=16)	70.0% (n=30)	39.9% (N=298)
Four or more	32.9% (N=82)	100.0% (N=5)	80.0% (n=5)	39.1% (N=92)
Technical violations only				
One	4.0% (N=1116)**	49.0% (N=204)**	29.9% (N=97)**	12.3% (N=1417)**
Two	4.2% (N=520)	59.8% (N=107)	38.3% (N=60)	15.9% (N=687)
Three	6.3% (N=256)	71.4% (N=42)	53.8% (N=26)	18.5% (N=324)
Four or more	9.1% (N=297)	77.3% (N=22)	63.3% (N=30)	18.1% (N=349)

***p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05

Section V. Absconding

Absconding is a key focus of this study. We begin by exploring the relationship between each of our independent variables and absconding; we include the relationship between the independent variables and violations in general for comparison. While not displayed in the tables below, we did also examine these variables by supervision type. When notable, we describe these differences; tables summarizing the results between the independent variables and absconding by supervision type are available in Appendix C. We then dedicate the remainder of this section to multivariate analyses in order to better understand which factors are associated with absconding behavior.

Rates of Absconding

Overall, 33% of those in our sample had an absconding violation. As demonstrated in Table III.4 below, although significantly fewer parolees absconded than probationers or those under dual status, among those who did abscond, parolees absconded more quickly on average (205 days) than probationers (277 days) or those under dual status (339 days). Further reinforcing this finding, over half (51%) of parolees absconded within the first 136 days of supervision, compared to 36% of probationers and 29% of those under dual status. In all subsequent time categories, a smaller proportion of parolees absconded relative to those under other types of supervision.

Table V.1 Absconding Rates and Days to Absconding by Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual	All
Any absconding	(N=14379)	(N=2322)	(N=1328)	(N=18029)
% absconded	33.4%	28.9%	37.3%***	33.1%
Average days to absconding violation	(N=4801)	(N=672)	(N=495)	(N=5968)
Mean (s.d.)	277.93 (248.33)	205.26 (217.67)	339.90 (286.48)***	274.89 (250.26)
Grouped days to absconding	(N=4801)	(N=672)	(N=495)	(N=5968)
0-136 days	36.1%	50.7%	29.5%***	37.2%
137-273 days	24.5%	22.8%	21.6%	24.0%
274-410 days	15.2%	11.9%	16.6%	15.0%
411-547 days	9.9%	6.1%	10.9%	9.6%
546-682 days	5.1%	4.0%	6.1%	5.1%
683-819 days	4.3%	1.5%	6.9%	4.2%
820-956 days	2.7%	1.9%	3.8%	2.7%
957-1093 days	2.1%	1.0%	4.6%	2.2%

***p≤.001

The graph below illustrates the Kaplan-Meier plot of days until first absconding by supervision type. The horizontal axis represents days, while the vertical axis is the proportion of individuals who did not abscond. The three curves representing each supervision type differ in their steepness. The curve for parolees (the green line) is notably different from the curve for probationers (blue line) and those under dual supervision (tan line). The curve for the parolees indicates that they abscond more quickly, but

then absconding levels off. Conversely, the lines for parolees and those under dual supervision are more linear in nature, suggesting that they continue to abscond at higher rates than parolees throughout their supervision.

Figure V.1 Plot of days until first absconding by supervision type



Demographics and absconding

As demonstrated in Table V.2, males violated conditions of supervision and absconded more often than females. While statistically significant, the proportions were not substantively different (4% more males violated, 2% more males absconded). Individuals identified as Hispanic had the highest rates of violations in general, followed by African Americans and Native Americans. The highest rates of absconding were found for individuals identified as Hispanic or African American (36%). Individuals who were identified as "other," which includes Asians, Pacific Islanders, and those for whom race/ethnicity were not recorded, accounted for the smallest proportion of both violations and absconding. This group also had the longest time to absconding, while Native Americans had the shortest average time to absconding. These differences in rates of violations, absconding, and time to absconding were all statistically significant.

In general, the proportion of individuals with supervision violations, including absconding, decreases with age. The average age for those with absconding violations was slightly younger than that for any supervision violations. However, a somewhat surprising finding was that those who were 55 or older absconded more quickly compared to all other age groups, with those between 18-24 taking the longest time to abscond on average. This finding is reinforced with the significant negative correlation (-.076) found between age and time to absconding, indicating that as age increases the number of days to absconding decreases.

Table V.2 Demographics, Supervision Violations, and Absconding

	% with Violations (n=11527)	% with Absconding (n=5968)	Average time to absconding (n=5968)
Gender			(n=5944)
Male	65.4%****	33.8%*	271.56 (250.15)
Female	61.0%	31.8%	284.82 (248.46)
Race			
White	57.7%***	28.1%***	277.36 (247.65) (n=1430)*
Hispanic	68.3%	36.2%	278.07 (253.80) (n=3515)
African American	66.5%	36.4%	261.31 (235.29) (n=363)
Native American	63.2%	32.4%	253.25 (236.17) (n=606)
Other	31.8%	14.7%	336.78 (317.61) (n=54)
Mean age			Correlation
Violations	32.64 (10.27)***	31.76 (9.54)***	-.076 (N=5941)***
No violations	36.06 (12.05)	34.91 (11.60)	N/A
Age of Offender			
18-24	38.6%***	71.0%***	291.51 (255.76) (n=1594)***
25-34	36.9%	67.7%	288.85 (256.91) (n=2407)
35-44	32.0%	62.4%	242.24 (230.13) (n=1212)
45-54	25.1%	56.5%	242.18 (231.30) (n=611)
55 or older	12.8%	41.1%	237.98 (250.48) (n=117)

***p≤.001

While males are more likely to abscond regardless of supervision type, the differences were only significant for parolees (See Appendix C: Table C.1). Regardless of supervision type, absconders were younger on average than non-absconders. However, when we examined the data by age groups, we found that those between the ages of 25 and 34 absconded at higher rates than other age groups. However, this was true only for parolees and those under dual supervision; absconding decreased with increasing age for probationers.

Although time to absconding was shorter for males regardless of supervision type, the differences were statistically significant for those under dual supervision only. Likewise, while the number of days to absconding decreased with age for probationers and those under dual supervision, this difference was not statistically significant for parolees. The bivariate correlation between age of offender and days to absconding was negative for all three groups (indicating that as age increases, time to absconding decreases), but statistically significant only for probationers. (See Appendix C: Table C.2).

Social capital and absconding

We hypothesize that those individuals whose RNA results suggest they have lower positive social capital will be less likely to violate conditions of supervision, and especially less likely to abscond. Indeed, the data revealed that individuals who are unemployed or underemployed are significantly more likely to have one or more violations while on supervision, and are more likely to abscond compared to those who are employed. Furthermore, those with negative social ties- either known negative associations or

known or suspected gang involvement- are more likely to have violations generally and to abscond. Although time to absconding was significantly shorter for those who were unemployed or underemployed compared to those who were employed, time to absconding was not significantly different for those with negative social ties compared to those without known negative social ties. These results are illustrated in Table V.3 below.

Table V.3 Social Capital, Supervision Violations, and Absconding

	% with violations	% absconding	Days to first absconding
Employed (n=5570)	56.8%***	24.2%***	294.61 (258.59) (n=1405)**
Unemployed (n=11896)	68.4%	37.0%	273.70 (247.71) (n=4404)
No known negative associations (n=8596)	60.9%***	30.2%***	280.08 (252.40) (n=2598)
Known negative associations (n=8870)	68.5%	36.2%	277.69 (249.03) (n=3211)
No gang involvement (n=16126)	63.7%***	32.2%***	279.99 (250.25) (n=5197)
Suspected/validated gang (n=5809)	77.2%	45.7%	268.28 (252.74) (n=612)

***p≤.001

The relationship between absconding and employment status was mediated by supervision type, however. While we found that unemployed probationers were significantly more likely to abscond than employed probationers (38.5% compared to 23.4%, respectively), unemployed parolees were significantly *less* likely to abscond than employed parolees (28.1% versus 33.9%). There were no significant differences in absconding behavior for dual status individuals by employment type. These results are available in Table C.3, Appendix C.

In addition, while those with negative associations were more likely to abscond regardless of supervision type, the difference was statistically significant only for probationers and those under dual status. However, those with suspected or validated gang involvement were significantly more likely to abscond regardless of supervision type.

Generally, those with less positive social capital had a shorter average number of days to absconding compared to those with higher positive social capital. However, once we considered supervision type, this relationship held only for the measurement of gang involvement, but the differences were not statistically significant. Both parolees and those under dual supervision had a longer time to absconding if they were unemployed, but it was shorter for probationers who were unemployed. These differences were statistically significant for probationers and parolees. There were no significant differences by supervision type and negative associations for time to absconding (see Table C.4, in Appendix C for details).

Stability and absconding

We expect that measures of stability will be related to both violations and absconding; that is, those with increased instability will be more likely to violate supervision and to abscond. Indeed, we find that this is the case as Table V.4 demonstrates. The proportion of individuals who violated supervision and

who absconded were significantly greater for those who had less stability (moved two times or more, had drug problems, etc.) than for those who had more stability.

We also anticipate that increased instability will be associated with decreased time to absconding. Two measures of instability were significantly related to time to absconding: drug use and history of absconding. The average number of days to absconding was about 17 days less for those who had an identified drug problem compared to those who did not, and 45 days less for those who had a history of absconding versus those who did not. Time to absconding did not significantly vary for those who moved frequently compared to those who did not, nor for those identified as having a likely mental health problem compared to those who were not identified as such.

Table V.4 Instability, Supervision Violations, and Absconding

	% violations	% absconding	Days to first absconding
Moved 1 time or less (n=10229)	63.6%***	31.8%***	276.67 (248.44) (n=3249)
Moved 2 or more times (n=7237)	66.4%	35.4%	281.41 (253.16) (n=2560)
No drug problems (n=7149)	57.7%***	27.9%***	289.72 (255.64) (n=1993)*
Drug problems indicated (n=10317)	69.6%	37.0%	273.03 (247.65) (n=3816)
No likely mental health problems (n=15742)	64.0%***	32.6%***	279.24 (250.19) (n=5139)
Likely mental health problems (n=1724)	71.3%	38.9%	275.09 (253.24) (n=670)
No history of absconding (n=17271)	63.3%***	32.5%***	277.55 (251.15) (n=5618)***
History of absconding (n=758)	77.5%	46.2%	232.23 (231.84) (n=350)

***p≤.001

We also explored the relationship between absconding and instability by supervision type. We found that absconding was higher for probationers who moved two or more times (36.1% absconded) compared to those who moved once or not at all (31.5%). However, there were no significant differences for parolees and those of dual status (see Table C.5, in Appendix C). Probationers and those under dual status were significantly more likely to abscond if they had identified drug problems, but this was not true for parolees for whom we found no differences in absconding behavior by drug problems. While absconding was more likely for both those with a known mental illness and those with a history of absconding regardless of supervision type, these differences were significant only for probationers and parolees (not dual status).

The relationship between some measures of instability and time to absconding was also mediated by supervision type (see Table C.6, in Appendix C). Contrary to expectations, we found that parolees with two or more address changes had a significantly longer time to absconding on average compared to those who moved once or not at all (233 days compared to 198 days). However, no significant differences were found for probationers or those under dual status on this measure.

While drug problems were associated with a quicker time to absconding for probationers and parolees, this was significant only for probationers. Finally, a history of absconding was associated with a shorter time to absconding regardless of supervision type, though it was only statistically significant for probationers.

Prior offenses, current offenses, and absconding

Individuals with prior offenses were significantly more likely to have at least one violation of supervision than those who did not have any prior offenses, regardless of offense type. Those with prior involvement in the criminal justice system were also significantly more likely to abscond. However, a significantly smaller percentage of individuals who had a prior DWI absconded compared to those who did not have a history of DWI. Absconding was more prevalent for individuals with all other prior offense types.

The greatest percentage of supervision violators was among those with a history of property offending (72%), followed by those with a history of drug offenses (72%), other offenses (69%), and violent offenses (70%). Those with a prior property offense were also more likely to abscond relative to those who had other types of offenses: nearly 42% of property offenders absconded, followed by 39% of drug offenders, and 37% of those with a history of violent offenses.

Time to absconding was significantly shorter for those who had a prior offense of any type (274 days compared to 342 days). Additionally, those who had a prior property offense absconded approximately 22 days sooner on average than those who did not have a property offense, and those with a prior drug offense absconded about 18 days sooner than those who did not have any prior drug offenses; these differences were statistically significant.

We also found significant variations by type of current offense type. Those whose most serious current offense involved a property crime were significantly more likely than those with other offense types to have one or more supervision violations as well as to abscond. Supervision violations were less common among those with current DWI offenses (approximately 50%) and those with other violations (49%). Furthermore, DWI offenders were the least likely to abscond (17%).

Although current property offenders were more likely to abscond, their average time to absconding was one of the longest relative to those with other offense types. Those whose most serious offense was a drug, DWI, or "other" offense had the shortest time to absconding (all around 250 days), while violent offenders had the longest time to absconding (296 days on average); on average, property offenders absconded within 275 days. These differences were statistically significant.

Table V.5 Prior and Current Offenses, Supervision Violations, and Absconding

	% violations	% absconding	Days to first absconding
Prior offenses			
Priors of any type (N=17185)	65.6%***	34.3%***	273.95 (249.57) (n=5886)**
No priors of any type (N=844)	29.9%	9.7%	342.28 (289.48) (n=82)
Any prior violent (N=10201)	69.7%***	36.6%***	276.37 (252.82) (n=3734)
No prior violent (N=7828)	56.5%	28.5%	272.41 (245.97) (n=2234)
Any prior property (N=9740)	72.3%***	42.1%***	267.81 (248.35) (n=4097)***
No prior property (N=8289)	54.1%	22.6%	290.39 (253.78) (n=1871)
Any prior drug (N=7928)	71.9%***	39.2%***	266.11 (246.94) (n=3102)**
No prior drug (N=10106)	57.7%	28.4%	284.40 (253.52) (n=2866)
Any prior DWI (N=5704)	65.1%*	30.9%***	270.80 (249.47) (n=1764)
No prior DWI (N=12325)	63.4%	34.1%	276.61 (250.61) (n=4204)
Any other prior (N=13557)	69.2%***	37.2%***	273.85 (250.63) (n=5044)
No prior other (N=4472)	48.1%	20.7%	280.58 (248.31) (n=924)
Average number of prior arrests			(correlation)
Violations	6.35 (4.76) (N=11527)***	6.89 (4.93) (N=5968)***	-.067** * (N=5968)
No violations	4.00 (3.79) (N=6502)	4.82 (4.23) (N=12061)	N/A
Most serious current offense			
Violent (N=6005)	66.0%***	32.1%***	296.25 (265.25) (n=1993)***
Property (N=5063)	69.1%	41.6%	274.76 (248.53) (n=2106)
Drug (N=3852)	65.7%	32.1%	252.41 (232.50) (n=1236)
DWI (N=1704)	49.5%	17.4%	250.27 (241.48) (n=296)
Other (N=919)	49.3%	24.0%	253.40 (229.69) (n=337)

***p≤.001,**p≤.01, *p≤.05

Generally, supervision level did not mediate the likelihood of absconding by either prior offending or current offense type (see Table C.7, in Appendix C). However, time to absconding by prior offense did vary by supervision type (see Table C.8, in Appendix C). While both probationers and parolees absconded more quickly if they had prior offenses, individuals under dual supervision did not. These differences, though, were only significant for parolees. Furthermore, type of prior offense did not have a consistent relationship with time to absconding when we disaggregated the data by supervision type with one exception: regardless of supervision type, those with a prior property offense absconded more quickly than those who did not have a prior property offense. Parolees absconded significantly more quickly if they had a prior violent offense or "other" offense than if they did not have one of those offense types, while time to absconding did not differ for probationers or dual status individuals by these offense types. Both probationers and parolees with prior drug offenses absconded significantly more quickly than those without those offenses.

Time to absconding by current offense also differed by supervision level. Probationers with drug offenses absconded most quickly followed closely by those with "other" offenses and DWI offenses, while those with violent offense had the longest time to absconding. These differences were statistically significant. However, among parolees, the longest time to absconding was among those with "other" offenses, while drug offenders and DWI offenders had the shortest time to absconding.

Supervision characteristics and absconding

We expect that supervision characteristics will be associated with both violations and absconding behavior. Generally, we expect that those assessed at a higher risk will be more likely to violate and to abscond. However, we expect that measures intended to increase surveillance, such as involvement in special programs (e.g., intensive supervised probation) or monitoring (GPS, sex offender registration) will be associated with lower levels of absconding.

We found that as assessed risk level increased, the proportion of individuals with a violation increased, confirming our expectations. These patterns were the same for absconding violations. Notably, nearly half of those assessed as an "extreme" risk incurred one or more absconding violations. Time to absconding also decreased significantly with increased assessed risk level.

Similarly, the percentage of violations generally and absconding violations in particular increased with increasing supervision levels. However, this was only true up until the category of "high" risk was reached; afterwards, the proportion of violations declined slightly. This is also consistent with our expectation that increased surveillance would be associated with decreased absconding. However, time to absconding decreased significantly with increased supervision level.

Moreover, as expected, the average number of special supervision conditions was significantly higher among those with violations compared to those without. Likewise, the average number of special supervision conditions was higher for those offenders who absconded than for those who did not abscond. The relationship between time to absconding and number of supervision conditions was positive and significant, indicating that a greater number of special conditions are associated with a longer time to absconding.

A significantly greater proportion of individuals who were required to wear a GPS monitor violated their conditions of parole relative to those who did not wear a monitor; this was also true for those who absconded. Note that this is inconsistent with some prior research (e.g., Padgett, Bales and Blomberg 2006), though other studies have found that those on electronic monitoring were more likely to commit, or at least get caught committing, technical violations (Cooprider & Kerby 1990). While those required to register as a sex offender were slightly less likely to violate their conditions of supervision, this difference was not statistically significant. They were, however, significantly less likely to abscond. Time to absconding was not significantly related to either special supervision requirement of GPS monitoring or sex offender registration.

Table V.6 Supervision Characteristics, Supervision Violations, and Absconding

	% with Violations	% with Absconding	Time to absconding (days)
Assessed Risk Level			
Minimum (n=3488)	49.5%***	19.9%***	299.71(244.02)***
Medium (n=7968)	61.6%	30.1%	296.22(247.65)
High (n=4095)	77.3%	44.4%	265.76(250.86)
Extreme (n=1915)	78.4%	47.0%	242.39(257.09)
Supervision level			
Minimum (n=279)	44.8%***	28.7%***	320.93(262.66)***
Medium (n=9386)	56.6%	26.4%	294.97(241.66)
High (n=4852)	76.3%	43.9%	268.32(253.65)
Extreme (n=854)	72.5%	38.1%	266.32(270.61)
Extreme special programs (n=2095)	74.0%	38.0%	257.09(256.38)
Average Number of Special Conditions			
Violations	7.90 (4.59) N=11527	7.85 (4.54) N=5968	Correlation .069 (N=5968)***
No violations	6.65 (4.27) *** N=6502	7.25 (4.50) *** N=12061	N/A
Special Supervision Requirements			
GPS monitoring	71.9%***	36.5%**	277.96(268.37)
No monitoring	63.4%	32.9%	274.66(248.86)
Sex Offender Registration	61.6%	20.4%***	325.93(335.40)
No registration	64.0%	33.3%	274.37(249.24)

***p≤.001,**p≤.01,

We did find some differences by supervision type (see Table C.9 in Appendix C). Specifically, we found that while absconding significantly decreased among probationers supervised at "extreme" or "extreme special conditions" relative to "high," we did not observe the same patterns for parolees or those under dual supervision. Specifically, absconding was highest among parolees supervised under "extreme special conditions" relative to all other categories. Additionally, 64% of dual status individuals who were classified as minimum supervision absconded, followed by 41% of those classified as "extreme special conditions."

The number of supervision conditions was significantly higher for probationers and parolees who absconded compared to those who did not abscond; however, we found no significant differences for those under dual supervision status. Regardless of supervision type, a greater proportion of individuals absconded if they were electronically monitored. However, the differences in rates of absconding by electronic monitoring were only statistically significant for parolees.

Time to absconding also varied by supervision type (see Table C.10 in Appendix C). While time to absconding decreased with increasing risk for the entire sample, when we separated it by supervision type, the patterns were much less clear, and indeed, clearly decreased only for probationers. Unexpectedly, minimum risk parolees absconded significantly more quickly than those assessed at any

other risk level. However, we find different patterns by actual supervision level (assessed risk with overrides). Parolees classified as extreme special programs absconded more quickly than parolees in other risk categories. Among probationers, days to absconding decreased with supervision level from minimum to high risk, after which time to absconding increased.

While the results above indicate a positive and significant relationship between number of special conditions and days to absconding, this relationship remained only for probationers when we disaggregated the data by supervision type.

Absconding by location

We did find spatial differences for absconding. Rio Arriba and Santa Fe Counties had the greatest proportion of absconders relative to the number of supervised individuals. These are illustrated in Map V.1 below and are depicted with the maroon color.[2] Harding County experienced the smallest percentage of absconders relative to the supervised population, which is depicted by the dark blue color.

[2] Warm colors on the map indicate above average percentage of absconding, tan indicates average, and cool colors (blues) indicate below average.

Map V.1 Absconders by County



We also examined the percent of absconders by supervision type within each county (See Appendix C: Table C.11). When looking at the state as a whole, we found that a higher percentage of those on dual supervision absconded compared to probationers or parolees. While most counties followed that trend, some did not. In six counties, we found a greater proportion of probationers absconded compared to parolees or those under dual supervision. Generally, parolees were less likely to abscond, though in Hidalgo, Torrance, and Valencia Counties a greater proportion of absconders were on parole.

Overall, individuals absconded an average of 1.65 times. While most people (57.7%, n=3449) absconded once, the maximum number of absconding violations per person was eight. It is noteworthy that parolees were significantly less likely to abscond multiple times (mean=1.35, s.d.=.67) relative to probationers (mean =1.69, s.d.=.98) or those under dual supervision (mean =1.62, s.d. =.90). The average number of absconding episodes per person was highest in Union County (2.29), Guadalupe County (2.25) and Los Alamos County (2.00); the fewest were in Harding County (1.00), De Baca County (1.15) and Mora County (1.35). For more details regarding absconders by county, see Appendix C: Table C.11.

There were also differences by census tracts within counties. The largest percentage of absconders originated from census tracts that had very few individuals on supervision. These were located in Bernalillo, Santa Fe, Taos, and Otero Counties. The census tracts with the smallest proportion of absconders were located in San Juan, McKinley, Grant, Dona Ana, Bernalillo, Sandoval, Santa Fe, and Harding Counties. Since the census tracts for some counties are difficult to distinguish, we created maps for counties with 12 tracts or more. These are available in Appendix D.

Map V.2 Absconders by Census Tract in New Mexico



Community characteristics and absconding

As illustrated in the maps above, absconding occurs throughout the state. While the spatial analyses indicate that there are certain counties, and census tracts within counties, where absconding is more prevalent, this does not tell us whether there are characteristics of those census tracts that correlate

with absconding. Thus, we examined the relationship between select census data, violations, absconding, and time to absconding.

We anticipate that absconders will be more likely to live in census tract areas characterized by community disadvantage, as will those who violate conditions of supervision more generally. As shown in Table V.7, bivariate analyses confirm that both violations generally and absconding specifically are associated with greater community disadvantage.

We also explored the correlations between the community disadvantage measures and time to absconding. Almost all the community disadvantage variables were negatively associated with time to absconding with a few exceptions. Of those that were negatively associated, all but the percent of households in poverty were statistically significant. The negative correlations indicate that as these measures of community disadvantage increase, the number of days to absconding decreases. Two variables had a positive relationship with time to absconding: percent unemployed and percent moved one year ago. However, neither of these was statistically significant. Overall, the results indicate that in places with high levels of community disadvantage, individuals are absconding more quickly than in places with lower levels of community disadvantage.

Table V.7 Community Characteristics, Supervision Violations, and Absconding

	Any violations (With violations N= 11359 No violations N=6058)	Absconding (With violations N=5860 No violations N=11557)	Correlation time to absconding (N=5860)
Average racial heterogeneity index			
With violations	.65 (.11) ***	.66 (.59)**	-.029*
No violations	.64 (.13)	.64 (.12)	
Average percent female head of household			
With violations	16.16 (5.01)***	16.23 (5.01)***	-.035**
No violations	15.72 (5.32)	15.90 (5.12)	
Average percent poverty households			
With violations	21.52 (9.86)***	21.62 (9.80)***	-.019
No violations	20.75 (10.17)	21.07 (10.06)	
Average percent household public assistance			
With violations	17.15 (8.63)***	17.26 (8.59)***	-.033*
No violations	16.40 (9.00)	16.70 (8.85)	
Average percent unemployed			
With violations	9.98 (4.80)***	10.08 (4.80)***	.005
No violations	9.60 (4.68)	9.73 (4.74)	

	Any violations (With violations N= 11359 No violations N=6058)	Absconding (With violations N=5860 No violations N=11557)	Correlation time to absconding (N=5860)
Average percent renter occupied housing			
With violations	35.58 (17.76)***	36.00 (18.16)***	-.032*
No violations	33.87 (17.11)	34.47 (17.22)	
Average percent moved 1 year ago			
With violations	16.20 (8.43)***	16.26 (8.43)**	.010
No violations	15.61 (8.31)	15.89 (8.37)	
Average population per square mile			
With violations	2590.01 (2631.40)***	2682.93*** (2677.15)	-.070***
No violations	2250.62 (2465.75)	2364.99 (2522.69)	

***p≤.001,**p≤.01, *p≤.05

The relationship between absconding and measures of community disadvantage varied by supervision type (see Table C.12, Appendix C). Both probationers and parolees who absconded lived in areas characterized by higher rates of disadvantage and diversity relative to those who did not abscond. These differences were all statistically significant for probationers. However, among parolees, the only variables found that were significantly different were: racial heterogeneity, percent of households in poverty, percent of households on public assistance, and population density. We found no significant differences in community disadvantage or diversity for absconders compared to non-absconders who were supervised under dual status.

Finally, we observed some differences between community disadvantage and time to absconding by supervision type (see Table C.13, Appendix C). None of the correlations between days to absconding and community disadvantage measures were significant for those under dual supervision. Among probationers and parolees, there was a negative relationship between each of the community disadvantage measures and time to absconding. One exception was found for parolees on the measure "moved one year ago." However, only three of these correlations were significant for probationers: racial heterogeneity, percent renter occupied housing, and population density. These results indicate that probationers who live in areas characterized by more instability, diversity, and population density abscond more quickly. Among parolees, the following variables were significantly related to time to absconding: percent female head of household, percent of households in poverty, percent of households on public assistance, percent of renter-occupied housing, and population density. This suggests that shorter time to absconding among parolees occurs more often in areas characterized by economic deprivation in population rich areas.

Multivariate analyses

While the above analysis shows considerable support for the hypothesized relationships between the selected independent variables and absconding (as well as time to absconding), we also present a more comprehensive analysis examining multiple independent variables at once to better identify risk and protective factors. We compute both logistic regression models as well as survival analysis.

Given that these data represent the supervised population across the entire state and that we are interested in examining the role of community characteristics, the observations can be conceptualized as individuals nested within communities. To the degree that community characteristics matter (which is supported by the prior results), this creates a potential violation of the independence assumption which is required for statistical significance testing in both logistic regression and survival analysis. Further, given that multiple individuals in the sample share the same community-level factors, it is important to examine the degree to which the independence assumption is reasonable. If this assumption is violated, then models which account for clustering (i.e., multi-level models) should be examined. We tested the data to determine whether a multi-level model was required (see Appendix E for details of the analysis and results). We found that clustering effects were present, though minimal. However, to ensure the independence assumption was not violated, we opted to use multi-level models.

Regression results

First, in Table V.8 we present the results of multilevel logistic regression models examining absconding for the entire sample. We computed a series of nested models in order to determine which sets of independent variables were related to absconding. This resulted in 7 different models illustrated below. We also include a random-effects intercept for the community in each model; this is significant in all models highlighting the need for the multi-level approach.

Table V.8 Multilevel logistic regressions predicting absconding for the entire sample

Variable	Model 1 (n=17184)	Model 2 (n=16808)	Model 3 (n=16808)	Model 4 (n=16593)	Model 5 (n=16593)	Model 6 (n=16593)	Model 7 (n=16593)
Gender (reference = female)							
Male	.072 (.040)	.106 (.041)*	.120 (.041)**	.177 (.042)**	.065 (.043)	.062 (.044)	.063 (.043)
Race/Ethnicity (reference = white)							
Hispanic	.302 (.040)**	.278 (.041)**	.291 (.042)**	.325 (.042)**	.207 (.043)**	.192 (.043)**	.185 (.044)**
Black	.410 (.078)**	.389 (.080)**	.405 (.081)**	.428 (.081)**	.338 (.083)**	.335 (.083)**	.316 (.083)**
Native	.208 (.066)**	.136 (.068)*	.156 (.069)**	.311 (.071)**	.225 (.071)**	.266 (.072)**	.270 (.075)**
Other Race	-.422 (.240)	-.310 (.247)	-.285 (.249)	-.047 (.290)	.020 (.294)	.031 (.234)	.019 (.293)
Age	-.029 (.002)**	-.027 (.002)**	-.027 (.002)**	-.022 (.002)**	-.206 (.002)**	-.025 (.002)**	-.025 (.002)**
Unemployment	-	.534 (.039)**	.470 (.340)**	.467 (.040)**	.418 (.041)**	.407 (.042)**	.410 (.042)**
Negative Associations	-	.173 (.036)**	.058 (.038)	.034 (.03)	.033 (.039)	-.014 (.040)	-.012 (.040)
Gang	-	.302 (.062)**	.208 (.649)**	.205 (.066) **	.107 (.067)	.070 (.068)	.067 (.068)
Two or More Address Changes	-	-	.084 (.037)*	.071 (.037)	.028 (.038)	-.023 (.039)	-.027 (.039)
Drug Problems	-	-	.309 (.038)**	.359 (.039)**	.314 (.040)**	.272 (.041)**	.273 (.041)**
Likely Mental Health Problems	-	-	.154 (.053)**	.146 (.054)**	.131 (.055)*	.107 (.055)	.101 (.055)
Prior Absconding	-	-	.370 (.081)**	.329 (.083)**	.143 (.085)	.112 (.085)	.108 (.085)
Current Offense (reference = property offense)							
Current Violent Offense	-	-	-	-.364 (.043)**	-.333 (.044)**	-.345 (.045)**	-.345 (.045)**
Current Drug Offense	-	-	-	-.407 (.049)**	-.380 (.049)**	-.334 (.050)**	-.338 (.050)**
Current DWI Offense	-	-	-	-1.092 (.079)**	-1.084 (.080)**	-1.091 (.082)**	-1.084 (.082)**
Current Other Offense	-	-	-	-.659 (.084)**	-.580 (.085)**	-.531 (.085)**	-.536 (.085)**
Number of Prior Arrests	-	-	-	-	.089 (.004)**	.083 (.004)**	.083 (.004)**
Current Supervision (Reference = Low/Medium Supervision)							
High	-	-	-	-	-	.450 (.044)**	.446 (.044)**
Extreme	-	-	-	-	-	.247 (.088)**	.246 (.088)**
Extreme with Special	-	-	-	-	-	.425 (.068)**	.412 (.068)**

Variable	Model 1 (n=17184)	Model 2 (n=16808)	Model 3 (n=16808)	Model 4 (n=16593)	Model 5 (n=16593)	Model 6 (n=16593)	Model 7 (n=16593)
Programs							
Special Conditions	-	-	-	-	-	.024 (.005)**	.022 (.005)**
Sex Offender Registry	-	-	-	-	-	-.506 (.163)**	-.496 (.163)**
GPS Monitor	-	-	-	-	-	.048 (.083)	.059 (.083)
Supervision Type (Probation = Reference)							
Parole	-	-	-	-	-	-.466 (.067)**	-.455 (.067)**
Dual	-	-	-	-	-	-.391 (.081)**	-.369 (.081)**
Racial Heterogeneity	-	-	-	-	-	-	.269 (.235)
Disadvantage	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Instability	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
% Female Headed Households	-	-	-	-	-	-	.001 (.007)
% Households in Poverty	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.001 (.004)
Population Per Square Mile (in thousands)	-	-	-	-	-	-	.022 (.013)
% Public Assistance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.003 (.005)
% Unemployed	-	-	-	-	-	-	.015 (.006)*
% Renter Occupied	-	-	-	-	-	-	.002 (.003)
% Moved 1 Year	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.002 (.005)
Constant	-744 (.056)**	-.588 (.082)**	-.730 (.083)**	-.669 (.088)**	-.792 (.090)**	-1.003 (.095)**	-1.321 (.188)**
Random Intercept	.146 (.020)**	.147 (.020)**	.150 (.020)**	.141 (.020)**	.134 (.020)**	.115 (.019)**	.107 (.018)**
LL	-10710.608	-10321.255	-10266.526	-10017.985	-9766.185	-9676.399	-9669.593

Model 1: Demographics

In the first model presented in Table V.8, we examine only the relationship between demographic variables and absconding. This model produces statistically significant findings for race and ethnicity, as well as age. In terms of race and ethnicity, individuals who are Hispanic, Black, or Native American are all more likely to abscond than whites. Specifically, the odds that a Hispanic individual absconds are 35.3% ($e^{.302} = 1.353$) higher than for whites, while the odds are 50.7% ($e^{.410} = 1.507$) and 23.1% ($e^{.208} = 1.231$) greater that Blacks and Native Americans will abscond than whites. Age is negatively related to absconding, suggesting that older individuals under supervision are less likely to abscond. Specifically, each additional year of age decreases the odds of absconding by 2.9% ($e^{-.029} = .971$). Though this is a small effect per year, this does suggest that an individual who is 10 or 20 years older than another individual would have greatly reduced odds of absconding.

Model 2: Social Capital

In the second model, we add measures of social capital to model 1. Being underemployed or unemployed, having negative associations, and being affiliated with a gang were all significantly related to absconding. Specifically, the odds of absconding for an individual who is underemployed or unemployed are 70.6% ($e^{.534} = 1.706$) greater than an individual who is employed; the odds that individuals with negative associations abscond are 18.9% ($e^{.173} = 1.189$) greater than those with no negative associations; and the odds that individuals with gang associations abscond are 35.3% ($e^{.302} = 1.353$) greater. The coefficients for race and ethnicity follow the same pattern of statistical significance as observed in model 1, though the size of the coefficients are somewhat smaller, suggesting that the social capital figures help explain some of the racial and ethnic differences in the likelihood of absconding. Interestingly, gender becomes statistically significant in model 2, suggesting some form of suppression effects. In other words, once we add the social capital variables, the effects of gender are no longer suppressed. Specifically, the odds that males abscond are 11.2% ($e^{.106} = 1.112$) greater than females, controlling for race/ethnicity and social capital variables.

Model 3: Stability

In the third model, we add measures of stability (address changes, drug problems, likely mental health problems, and a prior history of absconding) to the model. As before, each of these variables is significantly related to absconding and in the predicted direction. Specifically, the odds of absconding are 8.8% ($e^{.084} = 1.088$) greater for individuals who have had more than two address changes than for individuals who had one or fewer address changes. The odds that individuals with drug and likely mental health problems are 36.2% ($e^{.309} = 1.362$) and 16.6% ($e^{.154} = 1.166$) greater than those who did not have drug or likely mental health problems, respectively. The odds that individuals who have a prior history of absconding abscond again are 44.8% ($e^{.370} = 1.448$) greater than those who did not have a history of absconding. Gender, race and ethnicity, age, unemployment, and gang affiliation all remain statistically significant in model 3, though negative associations does not. This suggests that after accounting for stability variables, negative associations is not a significant predictor of absconding.

Model 4: Current offense

Next, we added current offense type to the analysis in model 4. We use property offenses as the reference category, meaning that the odds that an individual currently supervised for a violent, drug,

DWI, or other offense are described in comparison to those currently supervised for a property offense. Individuals who are currently being supervised for any of these non-property crime offenses are significantly less likely to abscond than property offenders. Specifically, the odds that an individual who is supervised for a violent offense absconds are 30.5% ($e^{-.364}$ = .695) lower than those supervised for a property offense, while the odds are 33.5% ($e^{-.407}$ = .665) and 48.3% ($e^{-.659}$ = .517) lower respectively for individuals supervised for drug or other offenses (compared to those supervised for property offenses). The largest difference, however, is for individuals who are currently supervised for a DWI offense; the odds that these offenders abscond are 66.4% ($e^{-1.092}$ = .336) lower than for individuals under supervision for a property offense.

Taken as a whole, these results suggest that, controlling for a wide range of other factors, property offenders are the group most at risk to abscond, while DWI offenders are the least at risk, with violent, drug, and other offenders falling in between. Interestingly, the addition of current offense type to the model did not change the pattern of statistical significance for any of the previously added variables, suggesting that the relationship between these variables and absconding is independent of current offense type.

Model 5: Prior arrests

In model 5, we add the number of prior arrests to the model.[3] As expected, individuals with more prior arrests are significantly more likely to abscond than those with fewer prior arrests. Specifically, the odds of absconding increase by 9.3% ($e^{.089}$ = 1.093) for each additional arrest. Though this is a fairly modest change in odds, it is important to note that there is considerable variation in the number of arrests. Moreover, the addition of prior arrests to the model reduces gender, gang affiliation, and prior absconding to statistical non-significance. This both further highlights the importance of accounting for prior arrests but also indicates that much of the reason why individuals with these characteristics (being male, having a gang affiliation, and a prior history of absconding) are more likely to abscond is perhaps that they have been arrested more often in the past. This seems reasonable, as males and gang members are likely arrested at higher rates than others, while individuals with more prior arrests likely have longer records and thus have had more chances to abscond in the past.

Model 6: Supervision characteristics

We add supervision measures (number of special conditions, GPS monitoring, sex offender monitoring, and supervision level and type) to model 6.[4] The relationship between each of these variables and absconding is statistically significant, with the exception of GPS monitoring. This indicates that individuals with GPS monitors are no more or less likely to abscond than those without. While this could indicate that GPS monitoring does not produce a deterrent effect, in order to know this for certain, we

[3] While we also calculated variables measuring types of prior offenses, we chose to include only number of prior arrests to represent criminal history. While not perfectly correlated, there was a strong relationship between type of prior offense and type of current offense.

[4] We excluded the assessed risk level from the model due to its strong relationship with supervision level, which reflected actual degree of supervision.

would have to know whether these same individuals would have been more likely abscond if they did not have a GPS monitor.

In terms of supervision level, individuals on high, extreme, and extreme with special program levels of supervision are all significantly more likely to abscond than those on low or medium supervision. The odds that an individual assigned to a high level of supervision abscond are 56.8% ($e^{.450}$= 1.568) greater than those on low or medium, while the odds of absconding are 12.8% ($e^{.247}$= 1.280) and 53.0% ($e^{.425}$= 1.530) greater for extreme and extreme with special programs respectively than those on low or medium levels of supervision.

The number of special conditions is also positively associated with absconding, with each additional special condition expected to increase the odds of absconding by 2.4% ($e^{.024}$= 1.024). Conversely, the odds of absconding are 39.7% ($e^{-.506}$= .603) lower for individuals who are registered sex offenders than those who are not. Taken together, these variables largely suggest that the classification system and the method by which special conditions are assigned in New Mexico are appropriate, as the individuals deemed the highest risk and those deemed to need the most special conditions are also most likely to abscond, even after controlling for all of the variables introduced in models 1 through 5.

Lastly, we also examine the relationship between supervision type (probation, parole, or dual status) and absconding in model 6. Supervision type is significantly related to absconding, with the odds of absconding being 37.2% ($e^{-.466}$= .628) lower for those on parole and 32.4% ($e^{-.391}$= .676) lower for those on dual supervision than for those that are only on probation. This indicates that those on probation alone are at the greatest risk for absconding, contrary to our expectations. However, this may be because the consequences for absconding are comparatively less severe for this population.

Model 7: Community characteristics

Finally, in model 7 we include community-level variables as level 2 covariates in the multilevel logistic regression models. We anticipated that there would be a high level of correlation between the community characteristics variables. Thus, we reduced these to a set of component score variables using principal components analysis (PCA) with a Varimax rotation. The PCA produced two component variables: disadvantage (correlated strongly with female headed households, public assistance, household poverty, overall poverty, and unemployment) and instability (correlated strongly with population density, renter occupied housing, and the percentage of the population who has recently moved). Interestingly, though these variables produced a strong PCA model (with two components with eigenvalues greater than 1 that accounted for a total of about 68% of the variation in the original measures), neither of these factors were significantly related to absconding. Although there is clearly correlation between these variables, after assessing the overall model for multicollinearity, we determined that there was not a significant problem with multicollinearity that would prevent using each individual factor.[5] Therefore, to further examine the role of community-level factors, we

[5] All Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were below 4, a typical cutoff for VIF. Values ranged from 1.01 to 3.43, with an average of 1.52.

estimated a multilevel logistic regression in which we used each of the community-level variables maintained as separate independent variables. We present these results in model 7.

The unemployment rate is the only community-level variable that is significantly associated with absconding. As the unemployment rate in the community increases by 1%, the odds of absconding are expected to increase by 1.5% ($e^{.015}$= 1.015), controlling for all other individual and community-level variables. It is somewhat surprising that none of the other community-level factors (regardless of whether they were used as distinct predictors or as part of the PCA) were significantly related to absconding, given that earlier analysis linked these measures to absconding. It is likely that this is reflective of the earlier finding that while there is community-level clustering in absconding, this clustering effect is modest.

Regression results: Absconding by supervision type

Next, we present a series of multi-level logistic regression models measuring absconding disaggregated by supervision type. Table V.9 presents the final models for each of these three groups (probation only, parole only, and dual probation and parole). The only difference between these models and model 7 presented in Table V.8 is that supervision type is omitted as an independent variable as it was used to disaggregate the sample into the three groups.

Table V.9 Multilevel logistic regression predicting absconding by supervision type

Variable	Probation Only (n=13365)	Parole Only (n=1943)	Probation and Parole (n=1285)
Gender (reference=female)			
Male	.019 (.047)	.469 (.181)**	.276 (.191)
Race/Ethnicity (reference = white)			
Hispanic	.172 (.049)**	.219 (.137)	.162 (.156)
Black	.312 (.095)**	-.063 (.253)	.653 (.265)*
Native	.202 (.083)*	.501 (.215)*	.893 (.310)**
Other Race	-.155 (.335)	1.889 (.932)*	1.231 (1.473)
Age	-.025 (.002)**	-.021 (.006)**	-.032 (.007)**
Unemployment	.521 (.046)**	-.179 (.144)	-.111 (.172)
Negative Associations	-.008 (.044)	.004 (.127)	.045 (.151)
Gang	.071 (.080)	.034 (.172)	.028 (.199)
Address Changes	-.034 (.043)	.111 (.122)	-.092 (.141)
Drug Problems	.331 (.045)**	.075 (.132)	.309 (.155)*
Likely Mental Health Problems	.108 (.061)**	.113 (.165)	.204 (.199)
Prior Absconding	.232 (.106)**	.066 (.184)	-.397 (.260)
Current Offense (reference = property offense)			
Current Violent Offense	-.380 (.050)**	-.320 (.142)*	-.237 (.156)
Current Drug Offense	-.324 (.055)**	-.352 (.158)*	-.589 (.193)**
Current DWI Offense	-1.092 (.094)**	-1.130 (.231)**	-1.093 (.291)**
Current Other Offense	-.568 (.092)**	-.038 (.296)	-.524 (.488)
Number of Prior Arrests	.095 (.005) **	.023 (.011)*	.084 (.014)**

Variable	Probation Only (n=13365)	Parole Only (n=1943)	Probation and Parole (n=1285)
Current Supervision (Reference = Low/Medium Supervision)			
High	.414 (.048)**	.550 (.181)**	.360 (.215)
Extreme	.236 (.113)*	.319 (.232)	.219 (.263)
Extreme with Special Programs	.193 (.093)*	.777 (.185)**	.339 (.223)
Special Conditions	.031 (.006)**	.021 (.015)	-.016 (.012)
Sex Offender Registry	-.313 (.216)	-.781 (.365)*	-.726 (.370)*
GPS Monitor	.239 (.210)	-.048 (.131)	.183 (.145)
Racial Heterogeneity	.390 (.254)	-.532 (.563)	-.086 (.753)
% Female Headed Households	.005 (.007)	-.020 (.017)	-.014 (.020)
% Households in Poverty	-.002 (.005)	.004 (.010)	.006 (.013)
Population Per Square Mile (in thousands)	.011 (.013)	.091 (.033)**	.030 (.038)
% Public Assistance	-.004 (.005)	.003 (.011)	-.009 (.014)
% Unemployed	.016 (.006)*	.014 (.014)	.003 (.017)
% Renter Occupied	.004 (.003)	-.012 (.007)	-.011 (.008)
% Moved 1 Year	-.003 (.005)	.004 (.011)	.014 (.012)
Constant	-1.629 (.205)**	-.627 (.516)	.012 (.625)
Random Intercept	.106 (.021)**	.078 (.061)**	.071 (.094)
LL	-7689.757	-1119.304	-779.727

**p≤.01, *p≤.05

The results of the probation, parole, and dual assignment models are similar to the aggregated model presented in Table V.8 in terms of the direction of the coefficients, though there are some noteworthy and important differences in the pattern of statistical significance. Indeed, only a handful of variables are statistically significant across models. These are age and number of prior arrests, as well as the dummy variable categories for the individual being supervised for a current drug or DWI offense. These results are similar to the results of the aggregated model above, with age negatively related to absconding, prior arrests positively related to absconding, and individuals currently supervised for a drug or DWI offense significantly less likely to abscond than individuals being supervised for a property offense.

The coefficients for supervision level were also similar for the probation and parole subgroups, suggesting again that individuals on higher levels of supervision are more likely abscond than those on lower levels (interestingly, none of the supervision levels were significant for the dual status group). In addition to these commonalities, negative associations, gang affiliation, address changes, and all of the community variables (except unemployment and population density) were not significant in any of the three models. Interestingly, the odds that probationers abscond if they have drug problems are 39.2% ($e^{.331}$= 1.392) greater than if they do not have drug problems, and 36.2% ($e^{.309}$= 1.362) greater for those under dual supervision. Somewhat surprisingly, this variable was not statistically significant for parolees, though this is consistent with the bivariate analyses which indicated no relationship between drug problems and absconding for parolees.

More notable are the differences across models. Gender is only statistically significant for those assigned to parole, with the odds that males abscond being 59.8% ($e^{.469}$= 1.598) greater than for

females. For those on probation or dual status, gender is not significant. Race and ethnicity are significant in each model and, in fact, the results of the probation model greatly resemble the model for the entire sample, as Hispanic, Black, and Native American individuals are all more likely to abscond than whites. The coefficient for Native American is substantially larger in the parole only and dual status models, where the odds that a Native American absconds are 65.0% ($e^{.501}$= 1.650) and 144.2% ($e^{.893}$= 2.442) greater than for whites. The "other" race category is statistically significant in the parole only model. Recall that parolees had the greatest proportion of individuals whose race/ethnicity fell into the "other" category while very few were recorded for probationers or dual supervision. This likely accounts for the differences observed here. Finally, African Americans were more likely to abscond than whites in both the probation only model and dual supervision model, but not the parolee model.

Underemployment or unemployment at the individual-level and the community unemployment rate were key findings in the results presented in model 7 in Table V.8. Yet in these disaggregated models, unemployment is only statistically significant at the individual and community level for those on probation. The magnitude of these relationships remains similar to the aggregated models for the probation-only model, while these variables fall short of the cutoff for significance in the parole and dual models. This is an interesting result, as it suggests that community unemployment is primarily a problem for those on probation. Indeed, for parolees, population density seems to be the most important community factor. As population density increases by 1000 people per square mile, the odds of absconding for parolees is expected to increase by 9.5% ($e^{.091}$= 1.095). None of the community-level variables are significant predictors of absconding for the dual category. Moreover, the random-effects coefficient is also not significant for the dual group either, suggesting that there are minimal clustering effects for this subsample, perhaps due to the relatively small sample of individuals on dual supervision.

A number of other variables are only statistically significant for probationers. A history of likely mental health problems, prior absconding, and the number of special conditions are statistically significant predictors of absconding only for this group and not for parolees or dual status individuals. Specifically, the odds that a probationer absconds if have a likely mental health problem are 11.4% ($e^{.108}$= 1.114) greater, and 26.1% ($e^{.232}$= 1.261) greater if they have a history of prior absconding than if they do not have these risk factors. Similarly, the odds of absconding increase by 3.1% ($e^{.031}$= 1.031) for each additional special condition probationers have on their supervision.

These results highlight the importance of data disaggregation, as they strongly suggest that a one-size fits all approach to understanding the risk of absconding is inappropriate and potentially misleading. Certain factors influence the likelihood of absconding for some types of individuals and not others. Moreover, this type of disaggregated analysis also allows for a determination of consistent risk or protective factors for absconding.

Survival analysis results

In addition to examining whether an offender absconds or not, it is also important to study which factors are related to when an offender absconds. The timing of this event might have important implications for how offenders are managed while under supervision.

In order to accommodate the multi-level nature of the data, we present a series of piecewise exponential (PWE) survival models with mixed effects. An important decision when estimating PWE models is to determine the form of the hazard function. Here, models were estimated using Exponential, Gamma, Lognormal, and Weibull distributions. The model using the Weibull distribution produced the smallest AIC values, suggesting it provided the best fit. The results of this model are presented in Table V.10. As with the prior logistic regression models, each model contains a random-effects intercept to account for community-level clustering. We present the full model (similar to model 7 in Table V.8), as well as models disaggregated by supervision type.

Table V.10 Piecewise Exponential Survival Analysis on Time to Absconding

Variable	Full Sample (n=16473)	Probationers Only (n=13262)	Parolees Only (n=1930)	Dual Supervision (n=1281)
Gender (reference = female)				
Male	.070 (.034)*	.035 (.036)	.401* (.153)	.242 (.151)
Race/Ethnicity (reference = white)				
Hispanic	.134 (.035)**	.131(.038)**	.132 (.113)	.082 (.122)
Black	.229 (.063)**	.212 (.072)**	.059 (.208)	.476 (.191)*
Native	.282 (.058)**	.246 (.064)**	.349 (.174)*	.841(.225)**
Other Race	-.025 (.246)	-.204 (.293)	1.398 (.551)**	.580 (1.062)
Age	-.020 (.001)**	-.020 (.002)**	-.020 (.005)**	-.027 (.006)**
Unemployment	.318 (.034)**	.416 (.037)**	-.165 (.117)	-.028 (.132)
Negative Associations	-.028 (.031)	-.040 (.034)	.081 (.104)	.060 (.115)
Gang	.015 (.049)	-.001 (.057)	.063 (.136)	.050 (.146)
Address Changes	-.037 (.030)	-.034 (.033)	.038 (.100)	-.115 (.107)
Drug Problems	.248 (.032)**	.306 (.035)**	.0692(.109)	.183 (.120)
Likely Mental Health Problems	.053 (.042)	.058 (.046)	.103 (.131)	.034 (.151)
Prior Absconding	.188 (.060)**	.285 (.071)**	.096 (.144)	-.189 (.194)
Current Offense (reference = property offense)				
Current Violent Offense	-.332 (.034)**	-.356 (.038)**	-.297 (.111)**	-.243 (.114)*
Current Drug Offense	-.245 (.038)**	-.224 (.042)**	-.278 (.125)*	-.452 (.148)**
Current DWI Offense	-.772 (.070)**	-.750 (.080)**	-.872 (.204)**	-.748 (.242) **
Current Other Offense	-.210 (.069)**	-.231 (.074)**	.059 (.229)	-.148 (.378)
Number of Prior Arrests	.057 (.003)**	.062 (.003)**	.028 (.008)**	.056 (.008)**
Current Supervision (Reference = Low/Medium Supervision)				
High	.323 (.033)**	.300 (.036)**	.430 (.158)**	.341 (.173)*
Extreme	.185 (.067)**	.147 (.082)	.243 (.202)	.371 (.206)
Extreme with Special Programs	.285 (.052)**	.083 (.071)	.670 (.161)**	.301 (.179)
Special Conditions	.006 (.004)	.009 (.004)*	.018 (.012)	-.010 (.009)
Sex Offender Registry	-.477 (.140)**	-.278 (.183)	-.797 (.326)*	-.674 (.309)*

Variable	Full Sample (n=16473)	Probationers Only (n=13262)	Parolees Only (n=1930)	Dual Supervision (n=1281)
GPS Monitor	.089 (.062)	.122 (.149)	-.011 (.104)	.119 (.108)
Supervision Type (Probation = Reference)				
Parole	-.237 (.052)**	-	-	-
Dual	-.344 (.061)**	-	-	-
Racial Heterogeneity	.301 (.195)	.394 (.207)	-.403 (.476)	.373 (.580)
% Female Headed Households	.004 (.006)	.007 (.006)	-.011 (.014)	-.007 (.016)
% Households in Poverty	-.001 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	.005 (.009)	.002 (.010)
Population Per Square Mile (in thousands)	.038 (.010)**	.031 (.011)**	.089 (.026)**	.047 (.030)
% Public Assistance	-.003 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	.001 (.010)	-.004 (.011)
% Unemployed	.008 (.005)	.009 (.005)	.005 (.012)	.002 (.014)
% Renter Occupied	.001 (.002)	.003 (.002)	-.011 (.005)*	-.010 (.006)
% Moved 1 Year	-.003 (.004)	-.005 (.004)	.003 (.009)	.006 (.010)
Constant	-6.764 (.168)**	-7.178 (.182)**	-5.307 (.451)**	-6.417 (.549)**
Ln (Shape parameter)	-.174 (.012)**	-.141 (.013)**	-.359 (.036)**	-.132 (.041)**
Random Intercept	.084 (.012)**	.080 (.014)**	.104 (.050)*	.096 (.064)
LL	-16387.228	-12971.396	-1944.511	-1370.914

***p≤.001,**p≤.01, *p≤.05

The full sample model indicates that many of the same factors which predict absconding in general also predict time until absconding. For example, race and ethnicity, age, unemployment, drug problems, offense type, number of prior arrests, level of supervision, type of supervision, and being on the sex offender registry are all significant predictors in both the full sample multi-level logistic regression and PWE survival models. Moreover, each of these variables predicts the outcome variable in the same direction, suggesting that the same factors which predict absconding generally also predict the time until a person absconds.

There are some notable differences. For example, the variables “male” and “history of absconding” are statistically significant in the PWE survival models, but not the multilevel logistic regression models. This suggests that while these factors do not necessarily predict absconding, there is some evidence that at any given point in time, the risk of absconding is higher for males and for those with a history of absconding. In addition to this, while number of special conditions was a significant predictor of absconding in general, it was not a significant predictor in the survival analysis model. This indicates that while those assigned more special conditions may be more likely to abscond, they are at no greater relative risk at any given time period. Lastly, while the community unemployment rate was significantly related to absconding in the logistic regression model, it was insignificant in the survival analysis and, instead, population density positively and significantly predicted time until absconding.

In terms of specifics, survival analysis regression coefficients are typically exponentiated and interpreted as hazard ratios which are essentially the relative risk of failure (in this case absconding) per time unit (in this case, days). For example, the hazard ratio for males can be calculated as $e^{.070}$= 1.073. This indicates that males abscond at a rate that is a little more than 7% greater than women per time period. Similarly, the hazard ratios for the race and ethnicity measures suggest that compared to whites, the risk of absconding for Hispanics, Blacks, and Native Americans is 14.3%, 25.7%, and 32.6% greater per time period.

Underemployment or unemployment, drug problems, a history of absconding, a longer arrest record, being assigned a higher level of supervision, and residing in a community with greater population density are all risk factors in these models. For example, the hazard ratio for individuals who are underemployed or unemployed is 1.374, suggesting that per time period, these individuals abscond at a rate that is about 37% greater than those who are employed. Age and being a registered sex offender, like the prior models, appear to be protective factors and decrease the risk of absconding per day. For example, as age increases by 1 year, the hazard ratio ($e^{-.020}$= .98) indicates the incidence rate of absconding decreases by about 2% per day, while the hazard ratio ($e^{-.477}$= .621) for registered sex offenders indicates that on average individuals from this group abscond about 38% less frequently per time period than other offenders.

In addition to the full model, Table V.10 also presents the results of the PWE survival models disaggregated by level of supervision. Much like the prior results, these models highlight the importance of data disaggregation. While gender was a statistically significant variable in the full sample model, the disaggregated models show that being male is only a risk factor for parolees. Similarly, under or unemployment was significant in the full model, but in the disaggregated models, this variable only achieves statistical significance in the probation-only model.

In other cases, variables that were not significant in the full model are significant in the disaggregated models. For example, while the number of special conditions was not a significant factor in the full model, probationers with more special conditions abscond at a higher rate per day than probationers with fewer special conditions. The effect of special conditions, however, does not extend to parolees or to those on dual supervision.

In general, however, the results of the PWE survival models largely support the results of the multilevel logistic regression models. Together, these models suggest that there is strong evidence that race and ethnicity, age, underemployment or unemployment, drug problems, offense type, prior arrests, level and type of supervision, and being on the sex offender registry are significantly related to absconding. There is some, but weaker, evidence that gender, a prior history of absconding, number of special conditions, and community-level factors like unemployment and population density also have an effect on absconding in general. Conversely, other factors do not seem to matter regardless of whether the problem is conceptualized as a dichotomous dependent variable or as a time until failure variable. GPS monitoring, for example, was not significant in any of the presented models. Variables reflecting gang membership and address changes were also not significant once other factors were accounted for. And

lastly, the vast majority of community-level factors were unrelated to absconding or the time until absconding.

Section VI. Summary, conclusions and recommendations

This study examined violations of supervision among a cohort of individuals under state supervision in New Mexico. We included probationers, who comprise the vast majority of those under state supervision, parolees, and those supervised under dual supervision. We focused on several key questions. The first set of questions was intended to improve our understanding of violations of supervision and revocations, and whether these varied by supervision type (probation, parole, or dual status). The second set of questions focuses on absconding; we built on our prior study of parole violations where we found that absconding/failure to report was one of the most common violations of parole and the most salient predictor of revocation. Our objectives for this part of the study were to assess the extent of absconding and whether, and in what ways, probationers differed from parolees and those under dual supervision status. We also explored possible risk and protective factors associated with absconding, and how these might vary by supervision type. We added individual and community characteristics that were not included in the prior study. In particular, we added measures reflecting individual stability as well as community-level variables reflecting social disorganization and diversity. In this section, we review some of the key findings and discuss the implications.

Violations and revocations

We began by exploring violation rates; most people in the study had at least one documented violation of supervision. Notably, parolees incurred fewer average violations than either probationers or those under dual supervision, and were less likely to have four or more violations. Regardless of supervision type, the most common type of violation type was for a drug offense. New offenses and absconding were the next most common offenses. While the average time to the first violation of any type was shortest for parolees, the median time was shortest for probationers: approximately half of the probationers incurred one or more technical violations of any type within the first 95 days of supervision.

It is possible that parolees are actually less likely to violate supervision conditions; alternatively, these findings could reflect decreased opportunity. That is, they are in the community for a shorter period of time due to prison sanctions or revocations. However, preliminary analyses suggest this is not the case; indeed, the relationship between time in the study and number of violations was not significant for parolees (though it is for probationers and dual status). Further, while parolees are revoked to prison at a rate that greatly exceeds probationers, it is similar to those under dual supervision.

Among those who violated the terms of their supervision, rates of revocation to prison were high for parolees and those under dual supervision (over 70% each), but low for probationers.[6] Included in this analysis are all returns to prison, so short term sanctions such as those administered under the Sanctioned Parole Violator Program (SPVP) as well as full revocations (serving the remainder of their sentence in prison) could be represented. In addition to differences by supervision type, revocation was also associated with the number of violations individuals accrued. As may be expected, individuals revoked to prison with a history of technical violations that did not include absconding or new offenses

[6] This is the rate of revocation for those who violated supervision only, not the entire sample.

had a greater average number of violations (2.25) than those who had a history of absconding (1.67) or new offenses (1.38). This finding, in conjunction with those regarding rates of revocation, are important as it appears that the NMCD and/or the courts are not rushing to revoke individuals who have committed less serious violations.

There were also interactions between supervision type, number of violations, and revocation. Generally, parolees who returned to prison committed fewer average violations compared to either probationers or dual supervision. Moreover, probationers were much less likely to be revoked to prison than either parolees or those under dual supervision, regardless of violation type. This suggests that parolees are more severely sanctioned than either probationers or those under dual status, perhaps reflecting their risk to the community. At the same time, this may indicate that probationers are deemed less of a risk, not requiring time in prison. However, there is an important limitation to this measure. We included only returns to *prison*, not returns to a local detention center (jail). This is a very important distinction. Local detention centers are charged with housing individuals who have violated the terms of their probation, and are detained pending investigation. Moreover, if the court finds the individual guilty and sentences them to fewer than 365 days, typically the time would be served in the local detention center, though judges have discretion and may choose to sentence the individual to serve time in a state prison.

Absconding

Absconding violations are among the most serious violations of community supervision. Consistent with our prior study (Denman et al., 2011), we used a fairly broad definition of absconding. We included in our definition those whom we typically think of as fugitives (e.g., those people who flee and avoid detection for some significant period of time), but we also included those who fail to report and then report shortly thereafter. This definition of absconding, then, includes those conditions that lead to a formal absconding investigation, but could include some who are not determined to be absconders in the legal sense. However, we did try to identify and exclude individuals whose absence included minimal or no disruption in reporting (e.g., the PPO found out that the person was in another county when looking through the cell phone; the person missed an appointment but showed up the next day) to avoid including individuals who really did not abscond.

Approximately one-third of those in our sample absconded and/or failed to report at least once. However, absconding rates varied by supervision type. The greatest proportion of absconders were those under dual supervision (37%); parolees had the fewest absconders (29%). The absconding rate among parolees is in line with the findings of our prior report on parole violations and revocations (Denman et al., 2010), where we found that approximately 27% of parolees absconded.

Time to absconding

We examined time to absconding using bivariate analyses. Many of the control and independent variables we included were significantly related to time to absconding. We found certain individual characteristics were associated with shorter times to absconding. Younger individuals, Native Americans, those under- or unemployed, those with a history of drug use or absconding, a more extensive criminal history, at a higher assessed risk or supervision level, and fewer special conditions of

supervision were all associated with a shorter time to absconding. We also found that time to absconding was associated with community characteristics. Those who lived in communities characterized by greater racial heterogeneity, female-headed households, public assistance, renter-occupied housing, or population density absconded more quickly.

The time to the first absconding incident varied by supervision type. Parolees absconded more quickly than either probationers or those under dual status. Moreover, the statistical significance of some variables changed once we disaggregated the data by supervision status.

Factors associated with absconding

Generally, bivariate analyses suggested that all of the variables we measured, both individual and community characteristics, were significantly related to absconding, and with the exception of GPS monitoring, were consistent with our expectations. However, when we disaggregated the data by supervision type, we found some differences suggesting that there may be different risk and protective factors for different supervision populations.

We estimated a number of multilevel logistic regression models to identify the variables associated with increased or decreased odds of absconding, while holding other variables constant. We included a model with all observations (we refer to this as the "full model"), as well as three models disaggregated by supervision type (probation, parole, and dual). We also completed a series of piecewise exponential (PWE) survival models with mixed effects. Overall, the results from the survival models mirrored those found in the logistic regression models, though there were a few differences.

Our primary purpose for focusing on absconding was to identify risk and protective factors that might help to better predict and prevent absconding among future supervision cohorts. We were especially interested in determining whether individual characteristics, community characteristics, or both best predict absconding behavior. These results have implications for the NMCD. We have identified several factors that are consistently associated with increased risk of absconding, regardless of supervision level and regardless of which analytic technique was used. These include age of offender, number of prior arrests, and property offending. While these factors do not predict that someone will abscond, they are consistently associated with an increased risk of absconding. This suggests that PPOs should be aware of these risk factors. Specifically, we found younger individuals, those with a greater number of prior arrests, and those with property offenses were consistently at increased risk of absconding.

We found that property offenders experienced both greater odds of absconding and rates of absconding. This is consistent with prior research on the relationship between property offending and absconding (Schwaner, 1997), as well as research examining violent crimes and absconding (Grattet and Lin, 2016). While property offending is often associated with drug use, it is important to point out that we did control for a history of drug use in these models. This suggests that there is something about property offenders, even after taking into account drug use, which is associated with increased absconding.

Although we found that race/ethnicity was also consistently associated with a significant increased risk of absconding, race/ethnicity should NOT be considered a risk or protective factor; rather, race/ethnicity

should be considered only a correlate to absconding. We found that Native Americans were consistently more likely to abscond than whites, regardless of which model we examined. However, depending on the model, other racial/ethnic groups were also found to be at significantly higher risk of absconding. It is important to better understand the role that race/ethnicity may play in absconding in interaction with other variables, which may help to explain the findings here.

Other risk and protective factors may be specific to the supervised population. For example, in the full model we found that unemployment (one measure of lower social capital) and a history of drug problems (one measure of instability) were associated with increased odds of absconding. However, after we disaggregated the data by supervision type, employment was only significant in the probation only model, while history of drug use was significant for both probationers and those under dual supervision but not parolees. Furthermore, a reported history of likely mental health problems and prior absconding (both measures of instability) were associated with an increased risk of absconding for the probation population only; these variables were neither significant in the full model nor in the parolee nor dual supervision only models. Prior absconding was also significant in the full PWE model, as well as the probation only model.

Together, these results suggest that there is a differential influence of employment and instability on absconding for probationers. We know that parolees and those under dual supervision have experienced a disruption of employment by serving time in prison. While some probationers may also have experienced a disruption of employment due to their criminal justice involvement, some, perhaps the majority, have not. Thus, differences in employment may reflect differences in social capital among probationers more than parolees or those under dual status. In other words, probationers who are not fully employed may have fewer ties to the community than those who are fully employed. Conversely, parolees and dual status individuals begin their supervision without those ties. Additional assistance with finding appropriate employment, particularly in areas characterized by a relatively higher unemployment rate, may be especially important in deterring absconding among probationers.

It is less clear why measures of instability would influence absconding behavior among probationers, but not parolees or those under dual supervision. It is plausible that parolees and those under dual supervision would be less likely to use substances immediately following release from prison, while probationers with a history of drug use may never cease using; this may influence absconding behavior. However, without evidence to support this, we do not know whether this could play a role. Furthermore, it may be related to the intensity of supervision after release from prison relative to probation. Regardless, these results suggest that it is especially important to ensure that probationers receive appropriate mental health and/or substance abuse services throughout their supervision. Additionally, it is important to note that probationers with a history of absconding are at greater risk for future absconding, but this may not hold for those under other forms of supervision.

Supervision characteristics, including supervision level, the number of special conditions required, and specific requirements of supervision were significant in some models, but not all. Contrary to our expectations, we found that GPS monitoring had no influence on absconding once other factors were considered, indicating that GPS monitoring is neither a risk nor a protective factor against absconding.

However, registering as a sex offender was associated with decreased risk of absconding for parolees and those under dual supervision. This suggests that registering may serve as a deterrent or protective factor against absconding. However, it is difficult to determine whether the requirement to register is the actual deterrent, or if there are other factors that we did not account for in this study that would explain this finding. Certainly, the current findings suggest that it is not detrimental to the community to require individuals to register, and in fact, may help ensure offender compliance with supervision. While we did not find this to be a significant factor for probationers, this may be a reflection of cell sizes rather than actual differences in absconding. Relatively few probationers in this sample were required to register as sex offenders compared to parolees and those under dual supervision, which may account for the differences here. Probationers subject to a greater number of supervision conditions were at increased risk and rate of absconding; however, this did not hold true for parolees. It is unclear why this may be the case.

We found that absconding was not distributed equally across the state. Some counties, and census tracts within counties, experienced a greater proportion of absconders per the supervised population, while others experienced much lower absconding rates. These communities are characterized by widely varying characteristics. We captured variables representing cultural diversity and social disorganization to assess the role community characteristics play in absconding violations. Contrary to expectations, once individual factors were considered, these community level factors generally did not play a significant role in explaining absconding behavior. However, we did find that probationers were more likely to abscond in areas characterized by higher unemployment rates, and parolees were more likely to abscond in areas with higher population density. The PWE models suggest that, at any given time, probationers and parolees are both more likely to abscond in areas of greater population density, though community unemployment was not significant in these models.

In summary, one of the key findings here is that the supervision populations, though similar in many regards, are also very distinct with different risk and protective factors. While those under dual supervision are often conceptualized as most similar to parolees, this study suggests that in some ways, they are more similar to probationers. For example, time to absconding for those under dual status was much more similar to probationers than parolees. This suggests different approaches to monitoring the different supervision populations. Parolees tend to abscond more quickly, so more intense monitoring may be required initially, while regularly monitoring individuals for possible triggers for absconding would be required throughout probation and dual supervision. Furthermore, while a history of drug use increased the likelihood of absconding for probationers and dual status individuals, it was not associated with absconding for parolees.

The finding that those under dual status were more similar to probationers in many ways was somewhat surprising to us, as we would expect those under dual supervision status to be more similar to parolees given that they have been incarcerated. Further research would help to determine whether this is consistent across cohorts, or whether this is something unique to this particular cohort.

A second key finding is that individual factors are more important for determining risk of absconding than community-level factors. While there were a couple of exceptions, most community-level variables

were not associated with absconding. This was a surprising finding, as different communities have different levels of resources and support available that we would expect to be associated with absconding. Moreover, prior research suggests that community factors play a role in reoffending generally (see, e.g., Kubrin and Stewart, 2006) and absconding in particular (Grattet, Petersilia, Lin, and Beckman, 2009).

Study limitations and future research

This study has some limitations that need to be considered when interpreting the findings. As noted previously, our construction of revocations is limited. We examine revocations to prison using the admissions data, as this is the most complete dataset. We did also consult the "response/action" variable from the probation/parole violation data, but this is often missing. However, we did find about 200 cases that indicated in the "response/action" variable that the individual had been revoked. We looked up these cases manually in the court data. We were unable to find a corresponding case in about one-third of those cases; among those we did find in the court data, we discovered that most had been revoked to a local detention center (jail). We decided not to include revocations to jail for this study because the only source for this information currently would be the probation/parole data. As noted above, this data is often missing information, so the results would be biased. Future research should include tracking admissions to local detention centers.

Second, we assessed whether someone was revoked, and whether he or she had particular violation types over the course of the study. However, we did not tie the specific violation to the revocation. For example, someone could have accrued an absconsion, a new offense, and other violation and ultimately be revoked for the other technical violation not the absconding or new offense.

Third, though nearly every person had at least one prior arrest, the data are limited because it may not include each individual's entire criminal history. For example, criminal justice contacts in another state or jurisdiction are not included here. In addition, though we attempted to identify all arrests, court cases, and incarcerations related to the term of community supervision of interest in this study, it is possible that some incidents are actually associated with the incident(s) that resulted in the term of community supervision for this sample (a current offense) and not prior offenses.

Fourth, we geocoded the address provided by the NMCD to identify the offender's census tract at the time they began supervision. Through the geocoding these data, we have discovered that many individuals under state supervision do not provide valid addresses to their probation/parole officers, which has clear implications for absconding. Importantly, those whose addresses we could not geocode were excluded from the analysis. It is possible that including these individuals could alter the results, especially once community level variables are included in the models. However, we expect that the differences would be minimal since the proportion of those excluded for this reason was less than 4%.

While this is a small proportion of the overall sample, it has implications for the NMCD. We expect that stakeholders from the NMCD are aware that individuals sometimes provide invalid (or no) addresses. Among those in our sample, less than 1% provided an invalid address; more frequently, no address was listed. It is possible that the PPO knows the address and it is listed in hardcopy records, but is not

recorded in the automated data. While not an extensive problem, it is important for the NMCD to know about to ensure records are accurate.

Finally, time to absconding begins with the "original effective start date" provided by the NMCD. For some people, this is the date that they were sentenced. For others, it is the date they actually began their term of supervision, which may be different from (later than) the date they were sentenced. Thus, for those whose start date reflects the sentence date but is different from actual start of supervision, the length of time to absconding would be overestimated. We did manually check some of the start dates; generally, we found that the date provided was the date they actually began supervision, but for some, that date was earlier than the date they actually began supervision. While we changed the dates to reflect the date the individual actually began supervision when we found them, it is likely that we did not identify all of these.

Although in many ways these data are robust, there are important considerations for using these data for this type of study. One of the challenges of determining whether someone was revoked from probation is that the "admission type" or "intake reason" is often recorded as a "new admission" or "returning admission" in the prison admissions data even though there are options for various probation violation admissions (absconding, pending charges and technical). By using a secondary variable called "status reason," we can sometimes determine that the individual was committed due to a probation violation, when recorded as "new commitment/prob violation." However, this secondary variable often says "new commitment" or "returning admission" even though the commitment is a result of a probation violation; further, it was missing in about 31% of the cases. This can result in underestimates of returns to prison for a probation violation. Indeed, we found that of the probationers we identified as incarcerated during their supervision period, 51% had neither an admission type nor a status reason that indicated the individual was in prison due to a violation of probation. We checked many of these cases manually to ensure that the individual really was incarcerated for a violation of this term of supervision, and found that the vast majority were. This problem is most significant for probationers, but we did find that admission type did not indicate a violation of parole for 5% of the parolees who were returned to prison and 14% of those under dual status. Thus, ensuring that the prison staff record the correct admission type would be beneficial to accurately track returns to prison for probation violations.

Another option for determining revocations is the probation/parole violation data. Here, there is a field called "response action." However, this is most frequently populated with "pending" or "guilty," but no sanction. Thus, ensuring that the sanction, if any, is recorded here would be another way to monitor violation outcomes, including revocations. Ideally, if sanctioned to incarceration, the location (local detention center or state facility) should be noted.

Future research

The NMCD has undergone some important changes that can influence absconding and the factors that contribute to it. They have changed from a system that required offenders to report to a probation/parole office to one where the PPD officers contact offenders at their homes or work (New Mexico Corrections Department, 2016). The STIU continues to work on apprehending absconders;

current Legislative Finance Committee report cards indicate that 28% of absconders were apprehended in the 2015 fiscal year, which was actually 2 percentage points higher than their target; this was also more than double than the percent of absconders apprehended during the 2014 fiscal year (New Mexico Legislative Finance Committee, n.d.). We expect that these changes could impact absconding behavior. The current study, then, can be considered a baseline for assessing the extent of absconding. Future research should use the same methods (following a cohort over several years) to assess whether absconding behavior has declined overall and by supervision type.

For this study, we included range of violations to indicate absconding (failure to report; status violations and visit violations associated with key words like "fugitive"). Although we did try to eliminate those violations in which it was clear that the officer knew where the client was located, we did include those in which an individual failed to report but then reported again subsequently. We did not, however, limit the data to those who achieved the legal status of "absconder." We expect that the results would be very similar to what was produced here, as failure to report violations are the violations that lead someone's status to change to an official absconder. Whether those who advance to that next level differ in any way from those who begin the process, though, is unknown. Future research should tease that out.

In this study, after controlling for other factors in the multiple logistic regression models and survival models, and after disaggregating the data by supervision type, we found that Native Americans were consistently more likely to abscond than whites. This is consistent with our prior work (Denman et al., 2010), which found Native American parolees were more likely to abscond. One possible explanation is that of jurisdictional boundaries. State criminal justice representatives seeking to apprehend absconders who have fled to reservations face challenges doing so due to sovereignty rules; some individuals exploit this limitation. For example, while the U.S. Marshalls can pursue fugitives in Native American communities, they must seek approval to do so first. This can result in delays, which make it difficult to find and apprehend absconders. However, while this is one possible reason, we cannot say with any certainty that this is accounts for this finding. Future research should explore whether there are interaction effects that may better explain this finding. For example, local unemployment may interact with race and account for the differences found here. Other options would be to use matching techniques (such as propensity score matching) to control for possible confounding factors and reanalyze the data to determine whether the results hold.

Finally, another area of research would be to better understand the role of sex offender registration and its apparent protection against absconding. While we captured whether registration was required for sex offenders, we did not capture whether they did register. Future studies should make that distinction to understand the role of required sex offender registration and absconding.

We are hopeful that the information provided in this report is beneficial to the NMCD and to other criminal justice stakeholders. Understanding violations of supervision, revocations, and factors associated with absconding are keys to promoting success among the supervised population and ensuring a safe community.

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Appendices

List of Appendices

Appendix A. Supervision Conditions

Supervision conditions vary somewhat by supervision type. While there are standard supervision conditions for both probationers and parolees, there are also special conditions of supervision that are imposed based on specific aspects of their cases. Those who have special conditions are expected to comply with the standard supervision conditions as well. We have duplicated the conditions of each type of supervision as listed on the New Mexico Corrections Department website, along with the description written there (see http://cd.nm.gov/ppd/ppd.html downloaded 7/27/17.

Standard Probation Supervision

"Standard supervision serves those offenders in the community who are less likely to re-offend and who do not fit the criteria of special programs. Some offenders are placed into standard supervision if they are pending acceptance in special programs. The following are the conditions of Standard Probation Supervision.

- **State Laws:** I will not violate any of the laws or ordinances of the State of NM, or any other jurisdiction. I shall not endanger the person or property of another.
- **Reporting:** I will report to my Probation/Parole Officer as often as required and will submit completed and truthful written reports as required by my Probation/Parole Officer. All communication with my Probation/Parole Officer will be truthful and accurate and I will promptly reply to any correspondence or communication I may receive from the Probation Office.
- **Status:** I will get permission from my Probation/Parole Officer before: a) Leaving the county where I am being supervised and/or residing; b) Changing jobs; c) Changing residence; or d) Engaging in any major financial contract or debt.
- **Association:** I will not associate with any person identified by my Probation/Parole Officer as being detrimental to my Probation supervision, which may include persons having a criminal record, other probationers and parolees, and victims or witnesses of my crime or crimes.
- **Supervision Level:** I will follow all orders and instructions of my Probation/Parole Officer including actively participating in and successfully completing any level of supervision and/or treatment program, which may include Community Corrections, ISP, Electronic Monitoring or other supervision/treatment program, as deemed appropriate by the Probation/Parole Officer.
- **Visits:** I will permit any Probation/Parole Officer to visit me at my home or place of employment at any time. I will permit a warrant-less search by the Officer of my person, automobile, residence, property and/or living quarters if he/she has reasonable cause to believe the search will produce evidence of a violation of my conditions of probation.
- **Employment:** Unless exempted, I will make every effort to obtain and hold a legitimate job and fulfill all financial obligations required of me including support of my family. I shall cooperate with my Probation Officer in any effort to assist me in obtaining employment. If I lose my job for any reason, I shall report this fact to my probation/Parole Officer within 48 hours of the change.
- **Weapons:** I will not buy, sell, own or have in my possession, at any time, firearms, ammunition, or other deadly weapons.
- **Drugs:** I will not buy, sell, consume, possess or distribute any controlled substances except those legally prescribed for my use by a State Certified Medical Doctor. I will also provide urine or breath test specimens for laboratory analysis upon request of the Probation and Parole division.

- **Arrest:** I will report any arrest, charge or questioning by a Peace Officer to my Probation/Parole Officer within 48 hours of the incident. The toll free number 1-866-416-9867 is available for emergency contact with my Probation/Parole Officer.

- **Transfer:** If my probation supervision is transferred to another state, I will abide by any additional supervision conditions required by that state.

- **Informant:** I will not enter into any agreement to act, or act as an "informer" or special agent for any law enforcement agency without the permission of the Director of the Probation and Parole Division and the sentencing judge.

- **Probation Costs:** I will pay probation costs as determined by my Probation/Parole Officer on or before the designated date each month to the Corrections Department in the form of a money order or cashier's check.

- **Photo:** I will submit myself for photographing and fingerprinting as directed by the Probation & Parole Division.

- **Alcohol:** I shall not possess, use or consume any alcoholic beverages and will not at any time enter what is commonly known as a bar or lounge where alcoholic beverages are served or sold for consumption on the premises."

Standard Parole Supervision

"Per statute NMSA 31-21-5, parole means 'the release to the community of an inmate of an institution by decision of the board or by operation of law subject to conditions imposed by the board and to its supervision.' The following are the conditions of Standard Parole Supervision.

- **Reporting:** I will report to my Parole Officer as directed. I will not abscond from parole, as evidenced by my failure to report where I cannot be located, after reasonable efforts, at my place of approved residence and employment.
- **Transfer:** If I am paroled or transferred to the custody of another State, I will abide by the rules in effect in that State, as well as the parole conditions imposed by the New Mexico Adult Parole Board.
- **Change in Residence/Travel:** I must seek and obtain permission from my Parole Officer before changing residence. I must secure a travel permit from my Parole Officer before any travel out of the county to which I am being supervised.
- **Laws/Arrests:** I will demean myself as a law abiding citizen. I will notify and advise my Parole Officer of any arrest within 24 hours (felony or misdemeanor).
- **Conduct:** I must maintain acceptable behavior and conduct which shall justify the opportunity granted to me by the New Mexico Adult Parole Board.
- **Drugs/Alcohol:** I will not illegally possess, use, or sell any narcotic drug, controlled or synthetic substance, or drug paraphernalia. I will not consume or buy intoxicating beverages, nor will I enter what is commonly known as a bar or lounge where intoxicants are sold.
- **Drug Tests:** I will submit to substance testing at my Parole Officers discretion.
- **Association:** I will not knowingly associate with any person who is a detriment to my parole. I will have no gang contact, attire, or paraphernalia.
- **Weapons:** I will not buy, sell, own or have in my possession, at any time, firearms, ammunition, or other deadly weapons of any kind.
- **Employment:** I will seek and maintain verifiable employment, education, or community service (if not employed) and notify my Parole Officer immediately in the event of termination or change of employment.
- **Visits:** I will permit my Parole Officer or Corrections Officials to visit me at all reasonable times, places, and will submit to reasonable warrantless searches per New Mexico Corrections Department policy.
- **Driving:** I will refrain from driving any motor vehicle without a valid NM driver's license, registration, and insurance.

- **Conditions/Fines:** I will comply with all conditions and fines imposed by the judgment and sentence, as ordered by the court."

Intensive Supervision

“Intensive Supervision provides concentrated supervision to each region's most high risk offenders. These offenders typically include gang members, repeat felons, and violent offenders.

- **Report:** I will report to the Intensive Supervision Officer at the Probation and Parole Division Office as required. This reporting requirement may be altered by the ISP Officer for the benefit of those participants who are employed full-time.

- **Abide by Curfew:** I will be at my residence during my designated curfew hours, unless I have written authorization from my Intensive Supervision Officer to be away from my residence during these hours. I understand that this condition may be enforced through the use of electronic monitoring equipment. I agree to use diligence in the care of this equipment and understand that any tampering with any part of the equipment can result in my immediate arrest. I also agree to immediately contact my supervising Officer if any questions or problems arise about the equipment.

- **Communication:** I must have a phone line in working condition within two weeks of being placed on Intensive Supervision, unless waived by my Intensive Supervision Officer. I will maintain a clean, safe and suitable residence. I will not have anonymous call rejections, voice messaging, nor any other phone service that interferes with my supervision.

- **Seeking Employment:** I understand that if I am not employed full-time I will report to the ISP Officer each day (Monday: Friday) and provide verification that I am actively seeking employment. Upon obtaining full-time employment, I will provide verification of all my income and its source each and every month.

- **Travel Restriction:** I will only travel outside of the county in which I reside with my ISP Officer's permission and only with a valid travel permit. Travel is limited to a 70-mile range from my county of residence and no overnight travel is permitted while under Intensive Supervision.

- **Community Service:** I will perform a total of thirty, 30 community service hours while I am under Intensive Supervision. A minimum of ten, 10 hours will be completed during each phase.

- **Alcohol Use:** I will not buy, possess or consume intoxicating beverages at any time and will not at any time enter a bar or lounge where alcoholic beverages are served or sold for consumption on the premises. There will be no alcohol at my residence.

- **Urinalysis Test:** I will submit a VALID urine specimen for analysis upon request. I will be prepared to submit such specimen each time that I report.

- **Search:** I will submit to a warrant-less search of my person, residence and personal belongings, including the automobile I am driving, by the Intensive Supervision Officer upon request.

- **Forbidden Association:** I will not associate with any person whom my Intensive Supervision Officer has forbidden me to.

- **Law Contact:** Any contact with local, State or Federal authorities, including traffic citations and/or arrest, must be IMMEDIATELY reported to the Intensive Supervision Officer.
- **Counseling:** I will attend and complete any counseling requited by the Court, the Parole Board, the Intensive Supervision Officer or Probation/Parole Officer. I will notify my Supervising Officer within 24 hours of any missed sessions
- **Obey P.O.:** I will obey all the lawful and reasonable demands of the Intensive Supervision Officer or Probation/Parole Officer."

Community Corrections Program

"Community Corrections Programs primarily serve offenders in the community based on the risk level and the needs of the offender. These offenders often have greater treatment needs. The Department works together with the behavioral health collaborative to provide the most suitable behavioral health services these offenders. Community Corrections programs also serve as a diversionary program for probation/parole violators who would otherwise likely be incarcerated.

- **Prog Length A:** The minimum length of time I must remain in the program is six, 6, months.
- **Prog Length B:** I understand that the length in program can exceed the minimum if program requirements are not met or I am non-compliant with treatment or supervision requirements.
- **Prog Length C:** I understand that the program will assess immediate sanctions for any occasion of non-compliance which may include but not be limited to: Electronic Monitoring, curfews, phone check-ins, additional community service, additional treatment sessions or support group meetings, additional office visits, house arrest, jail time.
- **Emp/Trn/Ed A:** I will obtain employment within 30 days of the program unless I am unable to work for certified medical reasons or unless I am attending school full-time. Offender will be required to provide verification of work or school attendance.
- **Emp/Trn/Ed B:** I will not miss work, training, or educational program/classes for any reason except for illness or emergencies. Any absence requires the approval of the Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager. Any unexcused absence will be considered non-compliance.
- **Emp/Trn/Ed C:** The program will increase reporting requirements and/or aspects of required programming when I am unemployed or not attending school full-time.
- **Emp/Trn/Ed D:** I will report to my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager all money I have received and the source of that money.
- **Treat & Appoint A:** I will show up at the scheduled time for all appointments made for and/or by me. I will not miss scheduled appointments without prior permission of my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager. Any unexcused absence will be considered non-compliance.
- **Treat & Appoint B:** I will participate in any counseling or treatment program my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager recommends and I will obey all rules of that program.
- **Treat & Appoint C:** I will attend any support group, i.e., AA, NA, recommended by my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager and will provide proof of attendance.
- **Treat & Appoint D:** I will submit to urine tests, breath alcohol or blood tests as ordered by my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager.
- **Living Environ A:** I will immediately report to my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager any and all disagreements or problems I am having or have had with my landlord, apartment

manager, parents or roommates that may affect my current residence. If the disagreement or problem does not immediately affect my residence then I will report any occurrence within 48 hours.

- **Living Environ B:** I may be placed on a curfew at any time. If placed on a curfew, be at my place of residence (as reported to my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager) at the time ordered and not leave from there until the time allowed.
- **Living Environ C:** At any time during the program, I may be placed in electronic monitoring.
- **Living Environ D:** I will allow my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager or their designee to visit me at home or elsewhere as often as they feel necessary and I will submit to a search of my person, residence, automobile, and personal belongings upon request by my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager or their designee.
- **Reporting A:** I will report to my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager as directed. I understand that my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager will develop and review with me specific requirements at each phase of programming and as I transition from phase to phase. Phase requirements will include reporting requirements, drug testing requirements, treatment requirements, community service requirements and may include additional program requirements such as curfews and electronic monitoring.
- **Reporting B:** I understand that the initial phase of programming will be the most restrictive and that as I meet program requirements and remain in compliance I will transition to less restrictive phases of programming until completion.
- **Reporting C**: I understand that non-compliance at any phase of programming may cause me to be assessed back to a more restrictive phase or terminated from the program.
- **Reporting D:** I will not miss a scheduled report date or time without PRIOR permission of my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager. Any unexcused missed reporting contact will be considered non-compliance.
- **Reporting E:** I will report to my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager with 48 hours all contacts with law enforcement agencies (including arrests, detention, questioning and traffic citations), and any discharges from employment, change in residence, and change in phone numbers.
- **Other Requirement A:** I will not do anything that would be a violation of my conditions of release as stipulated in my Probation Orders and/or my Parole Certificate.
- **Other Requirement B:** I will perform required community service as assigned by my Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager. I will complete a minimum of four, 4, hours of community service per month if employed full-time or enrolled in school full-time or any

combination of the two. Offenders shall complete a minimum of ten, 10, hours of community service per month if employed part-time, enrolled in school part-time or unemployed.

- **Other Requirement C:** I will not offer a gift or bribe to any staff member of the program.
- **Other Requirement D:** In the absence of my assigned Probation/Parole Officer or Case Manager, I will abide by the instructions of their representative.
- **Other Requirement E:** I understand that the program may amend this contract and/or change any phase requirement at any time during my stay in the program to include additional conditions that are determined to be necessary for my continued participation and that meets my treatment needs."

Drug Courts Program

"The Drug Court Program is specifically geared towards individuals who have drug/alcohol addictions, which have contributed to their criminal activity. The following are the standard conditions of the Drug Court program.

- **Conduct:** I will not violate any of the laws or ordinances of the State of New Mexico or of any other jurisdiction, and I will not endanger the person or property of another.
- **Reporting:** I agree to report to my Probation Officer (Drug court Officer) as often as requested.
- **Permission:** I will get permission from my Probation Officer and the Judge when applicable before: leaving the country where I live, changing jobs, or changing residence.
- **Association:** I will not associate with any person having a criminal record. (This condition may be changed in writing by the Probation Officer for any necessary reason that the Probation Officer considers appropriate.)
- **Following Orders:** I will follow all orders and instructions of my Probation Officer, and I will promptly reply to any correspondence that I may receive from the Probation Office.
- **Weapons:** I will not have in my possession, any firearms or deadly weapons.
- **Arrest:** I will report any arrest or charge to my Probation Officer within 72 hours of the incident. Further, I will report any contacts made with law enforcement for any reason.
- **Controlled Substances:** I will not use any substances that will cause a positive drug screen, including but not limited to narcotic prescriptions and/or over-the-counter drugs.
- **Alcohol:** I will not possess or consume any alcoholic beverages nor will I enter any liquor establishments."

Appendix B. Selected Sample Characteristics

Table B.1 Social Capital by Supervision Type

	Probationers (N=14021)	Parolees (N=2154)	Dual (N=1291)	All (N=17466)
Unemployed	66.2%	75.2%	76.9%***	68.1%
Known negative associations	51.9%	45.4%	47.3%***	50.8%
Suspected/validated gang involvement	6.6%	11.7%	12.9%***	7.7%

***p≤.001

Table B.2 Stability by Supervision Type

	Probationers (N=14021)	Parolees (N=2150)	Dual (N=1295)	All (N=17466)
Problems identified by RNA				
Moved 2 or more times	41.2%	42.4%	42.5%	41.4%
Drug problems indicated	60.0%	56.2%	53.4%***	59.1%
Likely mental health problems	9.8%	10.3%	10.2%	9.9%
History of absconding	3.3%	8.2%	6.5%***	4.2%

***p≤.001

Table B.3 Prior Arrests and Court Cases by Supervision Type

	Probationers N=14379	Parolees N=2322	Dual N=1328	All N=18029
Prior Arrests				
% with prior arrests	93.9%	89.7%	98.5%	93.7%
Average #	4.95 (4.28)	7.51 (5.14)	8.02	5.51 (4.58)
Median	4.00	7.00	(4.81)***	4.00
Range	0-40	0-33	7.00	0-56
			0-56	
Prior court				
% with prior court	89.9%	87.5%	97.8%	90.2%
Average #	3.67 (3.79)	2.73 (2.33)	3.29	3.52 (3.57)
Median	2.00	2.00	(2.58)***	2.00
Range	0-41	0-18	3.00	0-41
			0-21	

***p≤.001

Table B.4 Prior Incarceration Offense Types by Supervision Type

	Probationers (N=14379)	Parolees (N=2325)	Dual (N=1324)	All (N=18029)
% with prior incarceration	11.3%	35.3%	35.5%	16.2%
Prior Incarceration Offense	N=1627	N=820	N=471	N=2918
Any Violent	35.1%	38.2%	36.7%	36.2%
Any Property	33.1%	29.0%	30.1%	31.5%
Any Drug	26.7%	21.5%	24.6%*	24.9%
Any DWI	7.6%	15.1%	10.8%***	10.2%
Any Public order	7.0%	6.8%	5.5%	6.7%

***p≤.001

Table B.5 Prior Arrest/Court Offense Types by Supervision Type

	Probationers (N=14379)	Parolees (N=2325)	Dual (N=1324)	All (N=18029)
Prior arrest offense	N=13495	2081	1308	16884
Violent	55.3%	66.0%	65.6%***	57.4%
Property	53.3%	57.9%	59.3%***	54.4%
Drug	43.5%	48.1%	52.2%***	44.7%
DWI	32.4%	37.3%	31.2%***	33.0%
Public order	64.1%	78.1%	73.7%***	66.6%
Other	39.1%	73.2%	67.1%***	45.4%
Prior court offense				
Violent	42.6%	47.6%	53.6%***	44.1%
Property	46.0%	47.9%	48.2%	46.4%
Drug	34.9%	34.9%	40.7%***	35.4%
DWI	13.2%	20.7%	15.0%***	14.3%
Public order	32.0%	20.1%	20.2%***	29.5%
Other	4.9%	4.4%	5.2%	4.9%

***p≤.001

Table B.9 Supervised Population by County

County	Probationers per 10000 population	Parolees per 10000 population	Dual per 10000 population	Dual or parole per 10000	All supervision types per 10000 population	Total number under supervision	County population in 2010
Bernalillo	80.22	10.44	6.90	17.34	97.56	6,464	662,564
Catron	10.74	5.37	2.68	8.05	18.79	7	3,725
Chaves	64.89	11.73	8.99	20.72	85.61	562	65,645
Cibola	52.92	11.76	6.25	18.01	70.92	193	27,213
Colfax	94.55	9.45	15.27	24.73	119.27	164	13,750
Curry	117.00	10.96	15.50	26.46	143.46	694	48,376
De Baca	64.29	24.73	9.89	34.62	98.91	20	2,022
Dona Ana	54.05	9.03	6.50	15.53	69.59	1,456	209,233
Eddy	63.53	12.26	10.77	23.04	86.57	466	53,829
Grant	60.65	9.83	5.08	14.91	75.56	223	29,514
Guadalupe	93.88	4.27	2.13	6.40	100.28	47	4,687
Harding	14.39	.00	14.39	14.39	28.78	2	695
Hidalgo	49.04	6.13	4.09	10.22	59.26	29	4,894
Lea	81.11	13.29	7.42	20.70	101.81	659	64,727
Lincoln	57.57	13.17	4.88	18.05	75.62	155	20,497
Los Alamos	12.26	1.67	.00	1.67	13.93	25	17,950
Luna	96.43	8.77	3.98	12.75	109.19	274	25,095
McKinley	30.21	6.15	2.94	9.09	39.31	281	71,492
Mora	61.46	12.29	8.20	20.49	81.95	40	4,881
Otero	72.89	17.09	15.05	32.13	105.02	670	63,797
Quay	80.74	12.17	6.64	18.80	99.55	90	9,041
Rio Arriba	89.20	10.68	4.47	15.16	104.36	420	40,246
Roosevelt	89.69	17.13	11.59	28.72	118.41	235	19,846
Sandoval	77.90	26.22	2.85	29.07	106.96	591	130,044
San Juan	80.63	14.97	9.53	24.50	105.13	1,391	29,393
San Miguel	38.16	3.95	2.81	6.76	44.92	309	131,561
Santa Fe	43.00	3.47	2.43	5.90	48.90	705	144,170
Sierra	59.23	15.02	2.50	17.52	76.74	92	11,988
Socorro	55.41	16.79	3.36	20.15	75.56	135	17,866
Taos	57.08	4.86	1.82	6.68	63.76	210	32,937
Torrance	75.08	12.21	6.71	18.92	94.00	154	16,383
Union	61.55	10.99	10.99	21.98	83.53	38	4,549
Valencia	64.26	18.55	8.10	26.64	90.90	696	76,569

In the table above, we illustrate the number of individuals per 10,000 on supervision by supervision type for each county. The last column lists the total number of individuals on supervision in each county, without taking into account the county population. The county data includes the people we could not match to a census tract, but had enough address info to match to a county.

Appendix C. Absconding by Supervision Type and Independent Variables

Table C.1 Absconding by Demographics and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Gender			
Male	34.0% (N=10624)	30.8% (N=1944)*	38.0% (N=1132)
Female	32.3% (N=3658)	23.8% (N=265)	33.2% (N=196)
Race			
Hispanic	36.4% (N=7717)***	34.2% (N=1162)***	37.8% (N=818)
White	28.1% (N=4229)	24.9% (N=535)	32.3% (N=334)
African American	37.0% (N=763)	28.4% (N=134)	42.6% (N=101)
Native American	33.4% (N=1454)	25.4% (N=342)	47.2% (N=72)
Other	16.7% (N=216)	11.4% (N=149)	32.3% (N=3)
Age of Offender			
18-24	38.9% (N=3745)***	32.7% (N=226)***	41.9% (N=155)***
25-34	36.0% (N=5129)	37.9% (N=824)	43.9% (N=572)
35-44	32.2% (N=2845)	27.5% (N=612)	38.7% (N=333)
45-54	25.8% (N=1846)	23.1% (N=385)	22.7% (N=203)
55 or older	13.7% (N=703)	11.8% (N=144)	6.2% (N=65)
Mean age (s.d.)			
Violations	31.23(9.67);(N=4786)***	34.60(9.13);(N=660)***	33.07(8.03);(N=495)***
No violations	34.25(11.66);(N=9482)	37.85(11.02);(N=1531)	37.04(10.84);(N=833)

***p≤.001

Table C.2 Days to Absconding by Demographics and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Gender			
Male	276.89 (248.56); (N=3607)	197.75 (211.37); (N=598)	329.46 (288.49); (N=430)*
Female	281.32 (247.91); (N=1181)	222.46 (202.85); (N=63)	408.97 (264.63); (N=65)
Race			
White	274.27 (244.05); (N=1189)	249.08 (236.71) (N=133)***	346.17 (287.71); (N=108)*
Hispanic	282.65 (252.35); (N=2809)	194.59 (206.85); (N=397)	343.68 (292.95);(N=309)
African American	270.57 (238.04); (N=282)	140.29 (140.80); (N=38)	307.53(254.18); (N=43)
Native American	263.14 (238.58); (N=485)	168.89 (182.43); (N=87)	328.15 (273.95) (N=34)
Other	288.00 (280.15); (N=36)	443.12 (380.70); (N=17)	285.00 (0); (N=1)
Age of Offender			
18-24	294.18(252.91); (N=1455)***	226.99 (266.45); (N=74)	305.12 (298.11);(N=65)***
25-34	292.83 (255.95); (N=1844)	209.93 (211.03); (N=312)	357.73(290.21); (N=251)
35-44	244.00 (228.20); (N=915)	165.21(176.69); (N=168)	330.13 (269.97); (N=129)
45-54	241.56 (230.63); (N=476)	209.57 (198.80); (N=89)	311.74 (281.85); (N=46)
55 or older	243.98 (244.30); (N=96)	160.12 (209.57); (N=17)	425.00 (468.64); (N=4)
Age at intake Days to absconding (correlation)	-.077 (N=4786)***	-.066 (N=660)	-.001 (N=495)

* p≤.05, ***p≤.001

Table C.3. Absconding by Social Capital and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Employed	23.4% (N=4737)***	33.9% (N=534)**	38.5% (N=299)
Unemployed	38.5% (N=9284)	28.1% (N=1616)	37.4% (N=996)
No known negative associations	30.0% (N=6738)***	28.6% (N=1173)	35.0% (N=685)*
Known negative associations	36.6% (N=7283)	30.7% (N=977)	40.7% (N=610)
No gang involvement	32.4% (N=13099)***	28.5% (N=1899)**	36.4% (N=1128)*
Suspected/validated gang involvement	47.8% (N=922)	37.5% (N=251)	46.1% (N=167)

* p≤.05, ***p≤.001

Table C.4 Days to Absconding by Social Capital and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Employed	309.99(259.68);(N=1109)***	180.77 (200.96);(N=181)*	325.41 (283.79);(N=115)
Unemployed	271.97 (244.08); (N=3577)	226.05 (225.66);(N=454)	348.31 (288.40);(n=373)
No known negative associations	284.03 (248.53); (N=2023)	218.19 (241.85); (N=335)	333.15 (282.09);(N=240)
Known negative associations	278.65 (248.25); (N=2663)	207.51 (192.24); (N=300)	352.35 (292.31); (N=248)
No gang involvement	281.37 (248.54); (N=4245)	218.88 (220.71); (N=541)	346.16 (284.23); (N=411)
Suspected/validated gang	277.07 (246.87); (N=441)	180.13 (211.98); (N=94)	325.58 (303.89); (N=77)

* p≤.05, ***p≤.001

Table C.5 Absconding by Instability and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Moved 1 time or less	31.5% (N=8247)***	29.6% (N=1238)	38.2% (N=744)
Moved 2 or more times	36.1% (N=5774)	29.5% (N=912)	37.0% (N=551)
No drug problems	26.9% (N=5604)***	29.9% (N=941)	33.9 (N=604)**
Drug problems indicated	37.8% (N=8417)	29.3% (N=1209)	41.0% (N=691)
No likely mental health problems	32.7% (N=12302)***	28.7% (N=1875)*	37.4% (N=1127)
Likely mental health problems	38.8% (n=1719)	35.3% (N=275)	39.9% (N=168)
No history of absconding	32.8% (N=13898) ***	28.2% (N=2131)*	37.1% (N=1242)
History of absconding	51.1% (N=481)	36.6% (N=191)	39.5% (N=86)

* p≤.05, **p≤.01,***p≤.001

Table C.6 Days to Absconding by Instability and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Moved 1 time or less	282.03 (246.03); (N=2599)	198.31 (219.07); (N=366)*	328.59 (282.69); (N=284)
Moved 2 or more times	279.65 (251.28); (N=2087)	233.31 (219.37); (N=269)	362.84 (292.87); (N=204)
No drug problems	298.74(253.22); (N=1507)**	217.35 (235.85); (N=281)	322.57 (282.02); (N=205)
Drug problems indicated	272.54 (245.61); (N=3179)	209.80 (206.27); (N=354)	357.64 (290.49); (N=283)
No likely mental health problems	280.89 (247.14); (N=4144)	219.18 (224.29); (N=563)	341.61 (291.26); (N=432)
Likely mental health problems	281.55 (257.73); (N=542)	165.90 (173.97); (N=72)	352.96 (255.79); (N=56)
No history of absconding	280.33 (248.96);(N=4555)**	207.06 (217.48); (N=602)	342.07 (289.90); (N=461)
History of absconding	233.50 (232.34); (N=246)	189.80 (220.25); (N=70)	310.41 (236.87); (N=34)

***p≤.001

Table C.7 Absconding by Prior and Current Offenses and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Prior offenses			
Priors of any type	34.5% (N=13757)***	30.6% (N=2108)***	37.3% (N=1320)
No prior of any type	8.5% (N=622)	12.6% (N=214)	25.0% (N=8)
Any prior violent	36.8% (N=7867)***	32.9% (N=1439)***	40.8% (N=895)***
No prior violent	29.3% (N=6512)	22.4% (N=883)	30.0% (N=433)
Any prior property	42.6% (N=7665)***	36.8% (N=1261)***	45.1% (N=814)***
No prior property	22.9% (N=6714)	19.6% (N=1061)	24.9% (N=514)
Any prior drug	39.6% (N=6165)***	34.8% (N=1049)***	41.6% (N=709) ***
No prior drug	28.7% (N=8214)	24.1% (N=1273)	32.3% (N=619)
Any prior DWI	31.9% (N=4497)**	24.3% (N=794)***	32.7% (N=413)*
No prior DWI	34.1% (N=9882)	31.3% (N=1528)	39.3% (N=915)
Any other prior	38.2% (N=10440)***	30.9% (N=1952)***	38.9% (N=1165)**
No prior other	20.7% (N=3939)	18.4% (N=370)	25.8% (N=163)
Average number of prior arrests			
Violations	6.39(4.76);(N=4801)***	8.77(4.99);(N=672)***	9.22(5.19);(N=495)***
No violations	4.23(3.82);(N=9578)	6.99(5.11);(N=1650)	7.31(4.43);(N=833)
Current offense (MSO)			
Violent	32.5% (N=4580)***	32.7% (N=842)***	39.5% (N=6005)***
Property	41.7% (N=4293)	37.5% (N=432)	45.7% (N=5062)
Drug	32.4% (N=3139)	30.6% (N=461)	30.6% (N=3852)
DWI	17.9% (N=1246)	14.5% (N=324)	19.4% (N=1704)
Other	25.2% (N=1121)	17.9% (N=263)	36.4% (N=1406)

***p≤.001

Table C.8 Days to Absconding by Prior and Current Offenses and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Prior offenses			
Priors of any type	277.31 (247.96); (N=4748)	198.45 (209.82); (N=645)***	340.43 (286.69); (N=493)
No priors of any type	334.15 (276.22); (N=53)	368.11 (321.89); (N=27)	215.00 (234.70); (N=4)
Any prior violent	282.35 (251.34); (N=2895)	192.31 (215.04); (N=474)**	338.17 (282.62); (N=365)
No prior violent	217.23 (253.60); (N=1906)	236.27 (221.33); (N=198)	344.75 (298.09); (N=130)
Any prior property	273.25 (247.89); (N=3266)*	189.35 (212.02); (N=464)**	318.62 (273.04); (N=367)*
No prior property	287.90 (249.04); (N=1535)	240.75 (226.28); (N=208)	400.90 (315.15); (N=128)
Any prior drug	270.33 (246.36); (N=2442)*	184.56 (193.57); (N=365)*	332.03 (283.04); (N=295)
No prior drug	285.80 (250.16); (N=2359)	229.87 (241.26); (N=307)	351.51 (291.80); (N=200)
Any prior DWI	272.44 (245.80); (N=1436)	199.27 (204.64); (N=193)	355.64 (311.77); (N=135)
No prior DWI	280.28 (249.40); (N=3365)	207.68 (222.87); (N=479)	333.99 (276.63); (N=360)
Any other prior	279.17 (250.39); (N=3987)	194.30 (203.68); (N=604)***	333.04 (283.51); (N=453)
No prior other	271.86 (238.00); (N=814)	302.60 (300.72); (N=68)	413.90 (310.79); (N=42)
Number of prior arrests Days to absconding (correlation)	-.044 (N=4801)**	-.198 (N=672)***	-.103 (N=495)*
Current offense (MSO)			
Violent	304.94 (263.22); (N=1488)***	202.67 (229.89); (N=275)	351.92 (291.13); (N=230)
Property	276.23 (247.40); (N=1790)	206.24 (212.04); (N=162)	329.87 (280.71); (N=154)
Drug	252.39 (230.92); (N=1018)	194.79 (185.88); (N=141)	358.17 (289.26); (N=77)
DWI	255.39 (247.47); (N=223)	200.81 (171.01); (N=47)	295.73 (288.90); (N=26)
Other	256.27 (220.38); (N=282)	252.91 (286.10); (N=47)	155.13 (182.99); (N=8)

***p≤.001

Table C.9 Absconding by Risk and Supervision Requirements and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Assessed risk level			
Minimum	20.1% (N=3313)***	14.7% (N=95)***	17.5% (N=80)***
Medium	31.4% (N=6857)	17.2% (N=663)	28.2% (N=348)
High	48.2% (N=2898)	32.5% (N=726)	39.7% (N=471)
Extreme	51.6% (N=853)	40.7% (N=666)	47.7% (N=396)
Supervision level			
Minimum	27.2% (N=246)***	27.3% (N=22)***	63.6% (N=11)***
Medium	27.1% (N=8737)	14.8% (N=465)	23.4% (N=184)
High	47.0% (N=3832)	28.6% (N=639)	38.1% (N=381)
Extreme	42.0% (N=455)	28.6% (N=231)	40.5% (N=168)
Extreme special conditions	34.8% (N=751)	39.2% (N=793)	40.8% (N=551)
Average Number of Special Conditions			
Absconded	7.29(3.86);(N=4801)***	7.15 (3.95);(N=672)***	14.26(6.18);(N=495)
Did not abscond	6.81(3.84);(N=9578)	6.25 (4.12);(N=1650)	14.29 (6.03);(N=833)
Special supervision requirements			
GPS monitoring	41.0% (N=122)	33.7% (N=602)**	39.0% (N=431)
No monitoring	33.3% (N=14257)	27.3% (N=1720)	36.5% (N=897)
Sex Offender Registration	21.5% (N=163)**	15.3% (N=72)**	23.7% (N=59)*
No registration	33.5% (N=14216)	29.4% (N=2250)	37.9% (N=1269)

***p≤.001

Table C.10 Days to Absconding by Risk and Supervision Requirements and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Assessed risk level			
Minimum	300.68(239.45);(N=667)***	185(300.27);(N=14)***	368.21(363.25);(N=14)
Medium	292.06(244.05);(N=2183)	289.79(252.31);(N=114)	396.33(298.55);(N=98)
High	267.58(255.69);(N=1396)	212.26(197.94);(N=236)	319.72(262.13);(N=187)
Extreme	238.56(252.83);(N=440)	183.11(211.74);(N=271)	336.28(297.41);(N=189)
Final Risk Level (with overrides)			
Minimum	341.72(269.21);(N=67)**	207.83(232.69);(N=6)***	218.86(190.35);(N=7)
Medium	292.43(239.63);(N=2366)	291.14(246.26);(N=69)	440.91(300.46);(N=43)
High	264.76(251.04);(N=1801)	245.20(241.52);(N=183)	341.68(288.12);(N=145)
Extreme	271.49(273.46);(N=191)	203.89(229.70);(N=66)	312.40(291.20);(N=68)
Extreme special conditions	280.28(275.20);(N=261)	179.04(189.96);(N=311)	338.06(282.95);(N=225)
Number of Special Conditions			
Days to absconding (correlation)	.047 (N=4801)**	-.021 (N=672)	.036 (N=495)
Special supervision requirements			
GPS monitoring	329.70(304.02);(N=50)	203.76 (213.75);(N=203)	352.22(292.77);(N=168)
No monitoring	277.39(247.66);(N=4751)	205.91(219.57);(N=469)	333.57(283.43);(N=327)
Sex Offender Registration	282.89(329.22);(N=35)	357.91(382.19);(N=11)	408.43(318.65);(N=14)
No registration	277.90(247.68);(N=4766)	202.72(213.45);(N=661)	337.90(285.61);(N=481)

***p≤.001

Table C.11 Absconding by County

County	% Absconders among probationers	% Absconders among Parolees	% Absconders among dual	% Absconders overall	Total number of absconders	Total number under supervision	Average absconding events per absconder
Bernalillo	37.50%	38.73%	40.92%	37.87%	2448	6464	1.73
Catron	25.00%	0.00%	100.00%	28.57%	2	7	1.50
Chaves	37.09%	32.47%	40.68%	36.83%	207	562	1.72
Cibola	40.97%	34.38%	47.06%	40.41%	78	193	1.82
Colfax	26.92%	7.69%	47.62%	28.05%	46	164	1.93
Curry	23.5%	15.09%	14.67%	21.90%	152	694	1.69
De Baca	7.69%	0.00%	0.00%	5.00%	1	20	1.00
Dona Ana	25.55%	24.87%	33.82%	26.24%	382	1456	1.49
Eddy	36.55%	18.18%	44.83%	34.98%	163	466	1.50
Grant	41.90%	34.48%	40.00%	40.81%	91	223	1.63
Guadalupe	15.91%	0.00%	100.00%	17.02%	8	47	2.25
Harding	0.00%	n/a	0.00%	0.00%	0	2	0
Hidalgo	12.50%	33.33%	0.00%	13.79%	4	29	1.50
Lea	35.81%	16.28%	37.5%	33.38%	220	659	1.76
Lincoln	20.34%	7.41%	70.00%	21.29%	33	155	1.61
Los Alamos	18.18%	0.00%	n/a	16.00%	4	25	2.00
Luna	33.06%	27.27%	50.00%	33.21%	91	274	1.41
McKinley	30.56%	22.73%	38.10%	29.89%	84	281	1.35
Mora	30.00%	33.33%	50.00%	32.50%	13	40	1.15
Otero	28.82%	23.85%	29.17%	28.06%	188	670	1.39
Quay	39.73%	27.27%	50.00%	38.89%	35	90	1.80
Rio Arriba	45.68%	32.56%	61.11%	45.00%	189	420	1.63
Roosevelt	16.85%	29.41%	39.13%	20.85%	49	235	1.41
Sandoval	37.25%	34.62%	32.43%	36.72%	310	1391	1.45
San Juan	23.00%	19.35%	29.73%	22.29%	89	309	1.53
San Miguel	32.49%	15.91%	17.86%	28.80%	217	591	1.71
Santa Fe	44.84%	38.00%	45.71%	44.40%	313	705	1.76
Sierra	22.54%	11.11%	33.33%	20.65%	19	92	1.68
Socorro	28.28%	30.00%	50.00%	29.63%	40	135	1.38
Taos	36.70%	31.25%	50.00%	36.67%	77	210	1.82
Torrance	35.77%	50.00%	27.27%	37.01%	57	154	1.47
Union	14.29%	0.00%	60.00%	18.42%	7	38	2.29
Valencia	36.99%	42.96%	41.94%	38.65%	269	696	1.60
County unknown	16.56%	8.93%	5.88%	15.41%	101	532	1.23
All cases	**33.4%**	**28.9%**	**37.3%**	**33.1%**	**5987**	**18029**	**1.65 (.95)**

Table C.12 Absconding by Community Characteristics and Supervision Type

	Probationers	Parolees	Dual status
Racial Heterogeneity Index			
With violations	.66(.11);(N=4702)***	.65(.13);(N=664)*	.66(.09);(N=494)
No violations	.64(.12);(N=9153)	.63(.13);(N=1588)	.66(.10);(N=816)
% female head of household			
With violations	16.20(5.02);(N=4702)***	16.50(5.03);(N=664)	16.10(4.85);(N=494)
No violations	15.83(5.20);(N=9153)	16.06(5.11);(N=1588)	16.34(5.14);(N=816)
% poverty households			
With violations	21.75(9.91);(N=4702)***	21.43(9.54);(N=664)**	20.68(9.06);(N=494)
No violations	21.07(10.15);(N=9153)	20.98(9.58);(N=1588)	21.27(10.00);(N=816)
% household public assistance			
With violations	17.26(8.64);(N=4702)***	17.25(8.20);(N=664)*	17.25(8.59);(N=494)
No violations	16.64(8.91);(N=9153)	16.44(8.36);(N=1588)	17.94(9.04);(N=816)
% unemployed			
With violations	10.08(4.86);(N=4702)***	10.17(4.65);(N=664)	9.96(4.36);(N=494)
No violations	9.73(4.78);(N=9153)	9.66(4.65);(N=1588)	9.96(4.47);(N=816)
% renter occupied housing			
With violations	36.67(18.64);(N=4702)***	33.35(16.42);(N=664)	33.16(14.91);(N=494)
No violations	34.76(17.66);(N=9153)	32.78(15.30);(N=1588)	34.45(15.39);(N=816)
% moved 1 year ago			
With violations	16.44(8.58);(N=4702)**	15.23(7.90);(N=664)	15.95(7.57);(N=494)
No violations	15.97(8.52);(N=9153)	14.98(7.60);(N=1588)	16.36(7.91);(N=816)
Population per square mile			
With violations	2729.52(2713.04);(N=4702)***	2541.94(2570.33);(N=664)***	2428.99(2448.12);(N=494)
No violations	2436.31(2558.64);(N=9153)	1974.11(2345.72);(N=1588)	2325.76(2376.85);(N=816)

***p≤.001

Table C.13 Days to Absconding by Community Characteristics and Supervision Type

	Probationers (N=4702)	Parolees (N=664)	Dual (N=494)
Racial Heterogeneity Index	-.032*	-.022	-.037
% female head of household	-.018	-.146***	-.043
% poverty households	.000	-.101**	-.085
% household public assistance	-.015	-.107**	-.120**
% unemployed	.017	-.049	-.026
% renter occupied housing	-.035*	-.106**	.051
% moved 1 year ago	-.002	.000	.092*
Population per square mile	-.076***	-.099*	.009

***p≤.001

Appendix D. Absconding Maps by County

Map D.1 Absconding in Bernalillo County



Map D.2 Absconding in Chaves County



Map D.3 Absconding in Curry County



Map D. 4 Absconding in Doña Ana County



Map D.5 Absconding in Eddy County



Map D.6 Absconding in Lea County



Map D.7 Absconding in McKinley County



Map D.8 Absconding in Otero County



Map D.9 Absconding in San Juan County



Map D.10 Absconding in Sandoval County



Map D.11 Absconding in Santa Fe County



Map D.12 Absconding in Valencia County



Appendix E: Results of Assessment of Violations of Independence

The most common approach to address clustering is through the use of multilevel modeling, which at its most basic level involves adding a random effects coefficient to adjust for level 2 clustering effects. Table E.1 shows the results of two standard approaches to examining this assumption.

Table E. 1 Baseline models to examine clustering effects

Model effect	Standard logistic regression	Multilevel logistic regression
Fixed- Effects Intercept	-.679 (.016)	-.730 (.025)
Random effect Intercept	-	.121 (.017)
Log-Likelihood	-11123.447	-11035.641
χ^2		175.612**
ICC		.036 (.004)**

One common approach for evaluating the need to account for clustering is to estimate baseline standard and multi-level logistic regression models and then to determine if the fit of the more complex multilevel model is significantly better. A log-likelihood ratio test can be used to compare the standard and multilevel logistic regression models. This is calculated as twice the difference in log-likelihood values for each model. For our baseline models, this is 2 times (-11123.447 - 11035.641) which equals 175.612. Log-likelihood ratio test statistics are assumed to follow a Chi-Squared distribution and a test statistic of 175.612 is highly statistically significant at one degree of freedom (for the addition of the random-effects coefficient). A second approach to examining the issue of independence is to calculate the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) which is essentially the correlation between measures on a variable for individuals within a given cluster. In this case, the ICC reflects the correlation between absconding between individuals from the same community. The ICC is also statistically significant, again suggesting that clustering effects are non-ignorable. It is worth noting that the ICC is extremely modest for these baseline models. This suggests that while there is clustering within community meaning that there are some communities in which people abscond at higher or lower rates than average, there is also considerable variation within a given community on who absconds and who does not. The fact that the fixed-effects coefficient changes very little from the standard (-.679) to multilevel (-.730) further supports the notion that clustering effects (e.g., violations of the independence assumption) are minimal. However, we opted to present the results of the multi-level logistic and piecewise exponential survival models with random effects out of an abundance of caution as to ensure that our models are not biased by these clustering effects.